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This thesis is comprised of three essays on corporate governance issues. The first essay focuses 
on how board members’ geographical diversity relates to financial reporting quality. In principle, 
it is often argued that diversity has a positive impact on a group’s decision-making and 
monitoring abilities. In governance matters, while the attention has recently been placed on 
gender diversity, diversity is in fact multi-dimensional and encompasses attributes such as 
gender but also experience, expertise, independence and origins. The results show that a local 
board is more successful in monitoring financial reporting quality. The first essay provides 
evidence that although regulators are encouraging the diversity of boards of directors in all 
aspects, they may not be aware that each dimension of diversity may have a different impact on 
the performance of directors. 
The second essay ponders how the presence of foreign directors on audit committees affects their 
effectiveness. The rules-based approach of Canadian regulators with respect to audit committee 
membership has caused many Canadian firms to nominate foreign directors on their audit 
committees, especially from the U.S. The second essay provides evidence that the nomination of 
foreign directors to a monitoring committee, mainly due to the requirements regarding audit 
committee membership, may have reverse outcomes on the quality of financial reporting, even 
though these directors may share many similarities with directors from the country in which they 
are sitting on a board and to which they are geographically close. 
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The last essay looks at the effects of the adoption of a new set of accounting standards within a 
single national context, Canada, with different legal regimes (common law outside Quebec, code 
law within Quebec). The third essay offers evidence that the introduction of a new set of 
accounting standards may even result in a different level of financial reporting quality between 
firms, dependent on firm- and country- level governance mechanisms.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
In several countries around the world, financial scandals in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
have raised concerns about financial reporting. In reaction to these events, regulators have 
mainly used two ways to improve the quality of financial reporting. First, they have enacted 
policies to reinforce corporate governance mechanisms, especially boards of directors and audit 
committees. These policies focus on board or committee membership, the ultimate goal being an 
increase in the level of monitoring over the decision-making of managers. Second, in many 
countries, including Canada, they have pursued a strategy of raising the bar for financial 
reporting quality. Such efforts are illustrated by a complete restructuring of the governance of the 
former International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), which has evolved into the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Enhanced oversights by the international 
community as well as greater transparency have made the IASB, and its output, International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), much more credible as a source of relevant financial 
information for investors. As a result, several countries, most notably the European Union (2005) 
and Canada (2011) have adopted IFRS as their financial reporting framework. 
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There is extensive research on whether these regulations have been successful in 
increasing the confidence of stakeholders in the financial information environment and also on 
their anticipated and unanticipated consequences. This dissertation intends to shed some light 
into the potential implications from these policies on financial reporting quality. In addition, it 
focuses on how these two mechanisms, i.e., board governance and accounting standards, interact 
with each other. The three essays in the dissertation concentrate on three interrelated issues in 
                                                          
1
 While countries like the United States, China, Japan and India have not formally adopted IFRS, their standard-
setters and regulators have engaged into a dialogue with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and, 
in theory, pursue a goal of standard convergence, albeit with some missteps along the way. 
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this regard. The first essay focuses on how board members’ geographical diversity relates to 
financial reporting quality. In principal, it is often argued that diversity has a positive impact on a 
group’s decision-making and monitoring abilities. In governance matters, while the attention has 
recently been put on gender diversity, diversity is in fact multi-dimensional and encompasses 
attributes such as gender but also experience, expertise, independence and origins. However, less 
is known about how director diversity, especially geographical diversity, affects the performance 
of directors. The second essay ponders how the presence of foreign directors on audit 
committees affects its effectiveness. The rules-based approach of Canadian regulators with 
respect to audit committee membership has caused many Canadian firms to nominate foreign 
directors on their audit committees, especially from the U.S. But, the effects on a firm’s 
performance are not clear yet. The last essay looks at the effects of adoption of a new set of 
accounting standards within a single national context, Canada, with different legal regimes 
(common law outside Quebec, code law within Quebec). It examines the interaction between 
adopting IFRS and governance mechanism at firm- and country- levels. 
As a whole, this dissertation covers issues regarding governance mechanisms at the firm- 
and country- levels as well as new accounting standards and also the interaction between them. 
Specifically, the three essays address the following research questions: 
1. Whether a board of directors’ geographical diversity matters for financial reporting 
quality? 
2. Whether nominating foreign directors on the audit committee to meet the requirements of 
regulations contributes to financial reporting quality? 
3. How country- and firm- level governance mechanisms affect how the adoption of a new 
set of accounting standards influences financial reporting quality?  
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In the first essay, we give attention to the board of directors’ diversity that is attracting 
significant attention from regulators and institutional investors. Regulators are encouraging firms 
to increase diversity in their board-rooms in all aspects such as gender, ethnicity and geography. 
Some countries such as Norway and France have gone one step further and have adopted policies 
to increase gender diversity in board-rooms. However, less is known about the impact of each 
dimension of diversity on the performance of directors, especially regarding the monitoring of 
the quality of financial reporting. In this essay, we focus on a dimension of diversity, geography, 
which has been explored in very few studies due to the lack of credible data for the residential 
addresses of directors (e.g. Alam, Chen, Ciccotello and Ryan, 2012, 2014). We argue that the 
distance between directors and firm headquarters affects directors’ monitoring power over 
managers’ decision-making. The results show that directors who live close to a company are 
more effective in monitoring managers’ decision-making regarding the quality of financial 
reporting. Hence, the effects of diversity may vary across its various dimensions and regulators 
may need to consider this if they encourage firms to increase diversity in all aspects.  
In the second essay, we concentrate on a specific class of directors, foreign directors, and 
their monitoring power over the decision-making of managers. Foreign directors are becoming 
prevalent among firms all over the world due to globalization and improvements in technology 
and transportation (Alam et al, 2012, Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2012). However, evidence on their 
effects on a firm’s performance is mixed so far. The Canadian setting, with a rules-based 
approach to audit committee membership, provides a good environment in which to investigate 
how the nomination of foreign directors to fulfill the requirements of regulations may affect the 
performance of directors. The results show that many Canadian firms rely on the U.S. directors’ 
market to fill their audit committees. In addition, firms with a higher percentage of foreign 
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directors on their audit committee have a lower quality of financial reporting. The findings are 
interesting since previous research shows that hiring directors from countries with many 
similarities and from those which are geographically close will have positive effects on firm 
performance. Nonetheless, it seems that when they are nominated to fulfill regulatory 
requirements, then their impact might be different.  
The third essay focuses on the consequences of adopting a new set of accounting 
standards to improve the quality of financial reporting. It also explores how governance 
mechanisms at the firm- and country- levels affect the adoption process. Canada provides a 
unique setting in examining the effects of country- level governance mechanisms on the adoption 
of the IFRS, since in Canada itself, the province of Quebec is governed by French civil law and 
the rest of Canada is governed by common law. International studies so far provide mixed results 
as to the effects of country- level governance mechanisms on the adoption of the IFRS, which 
may be due to omitted correlated variables which are difficult to control for in an international 
setting. The findings show that, in general, IFRS have not improved financial reporting quality in 
Canada. However, the impact of the IFRS is slightly different for firms located in Quebec 
compared with the rest of Canada. For firms in Quebec, there is a slight decrease in earnings 
management that is not statistically significant. Yet, the value relevance of earnings has 
decreased in Quebec after the adoption, although it has not changed significantly for firms in the 
other provinces. 
In sum, this dissertation provides evidence that enacting policies may have unanticipated 
consequences that may impair the primary goal of the adoption in the first place. The first essay 
provides evidence that although regulators are encouraging the diversity of board of directors in 
all aspects, they may not be aware that each dimension of diversity may have a different impact 
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on the performance of directors. The second essay provides evidence that the nomination of 
foreign directors to a monitoring committee, mainly due to the requirements regarding audit 
committee membership, may have reverse outcomes on the quality of financial reporting, even 
though these directors may share many similarities with directors from the country in which they 
are sitting on a board and to which they are geographically close. Finally, the third essay offers 
evidence that introducing a new set of accounting standards may even result in a different level 
of financial reporting quality between firms, dependent on firm- and country- level governance 
mechanisms. Even in a single country setting, the introduction of a new set of accounting 
standards may not meet the anticipated goals. Overall, the results of this dissertation provide 
evidence for Canadian regulators in their policy making regarding governance mechanisms and 
also the setting of standards as well.  
 
The dissertation is organized as follows. The next three chapters present the three essays. 










Chapter 2: Board of Directors’ Geographical Diversity and Earnings Quality 
Abstract 
The diversity of boards of directors (or lack of thereof) is currently attracting significant 
attention from regulators and institutional investors. For example, the Ontario Securities 
Commission has recently issued for comment a policy statement on the issue. However, in this 
context, diversity is often constrained to gender or ethnic diversity, which are but two facets of 
the concept. Furthermore, irrespective of the diversity definition being used, there is a lack of 
evidence and consensus as to the effects of directors’ demographic diversity on several aspects of 
corporate performance, especially regarding earnings quality. Relying on the conceptual 
perspective that boards essentially perform two duties, i.e., the monitoring of management and 
providing resources to management (e.g., Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2010; Armstrong, 
Guay and Weber, 2010), we investigate how geographical diversity, -- directors’ geographical 
location relative to corporate headquarters-- affects firms’ earnings quality. We focus on a 
sample of Canadian firms, a large country with a wide range of board geographical diversity. 
The study takes advantage of the fact that Canadian securities regulations mandate that 
corporations disclose their directors’ personal residence locations. Our results indicate that 
directors of firms located in Quebec and Alberta are drawn from a concentrated geographical 
area. In contrast, firms located in the rest of Canada exhibit board of directors with more 
geographical diversity. Second, results show that earnings quality, as measured by the level of 
abnormal accruals and earnings informativeness, is less for firms with independent directors who 
are geographically spread out. In addition, firms with more geographically diversified audit 
committee members have lower earnings quality. These findings suggest that firm-specific 
effects from board diversity do differ and are conditional upon the facet of the diversity being 
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considered. Our results also indicate that Canadian regulators may need to take a more 





















In recent years, there have been calls by several stakeholders (regulators, social or ethical 
investors and academics) for greater diversity in the boards of directors of publicly-traded 
organizations. Such demands are consistent with the path taken by several countries which have 
established quotas for female representation on their boards (e.g., Norway, France and Spain). 
Australia, Belgium and France have adopted policies mandating that publicly- traded 
firms disclose their diversity programs or, if such a policy does not exist, provide justification for 
its absence. Similarly, the U.S. adopted a policy in 2010 mandating public firms to disclose their 
diversity policies. Following the U.S, Canadian firms are facing increasing demands to adopt a 
similar policy to encourage board diversity. For instance, the Ontario Securities Commission 
recently issued a policy document for comment that would require board of directors to increase 
gender diversity. 
The underpinnings of such trends usually rest on two arguments. On the one hand, most 
Western societies have enacted charters and laws stating that men and women have equal rights 
and opportunities and that any discrimination on the basis of gender is thus prohibited (e.g. 
Article 119 of the European Economic Community Treaty, 1957). It then follows that boards of 
directors, the critical governance mechanism in most private sector organizations, should reflect 
surrounding societal values and promote the status of women. On the other hand, there is 
extensive research in management and psychology which suggests that diverse teams tend to be 
more effective and better performing (e.g. Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003). Such evidence is 
then transposed to gender and ethnic diversity at the board level. 
However, before taking any regulatory actions regarding board diversity, there are at least 
two issues that need to be considered. First, board diversity is a multi-faceted reality and 
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accordingly, its definition often depends upon the perspective being considered. So far, diversity 
has been defined mostly in terms of gender or ethnicity. However, diversity has a wider meaning, 
as is reflected in Pamela Jeffery’s opinion, founder of the Canadian Board Diversity Council, 
“the findings suggest directors do not understand what constitutes diversity on a board. Having a 
single female director, she argues, does not make a board diverse:” (The Globe and Mail, Oct. 
21, 2010). The institute of corporate directors recognizes and actually encourages consideration 
of diversity in a comprehensive manner by stating that board diversity “defined as gender, 
ethnicity, age, business experience, and geographic background, can contribute to better 
corporate governance:” (Institute of Corporate Directors’ website, Canada, July 2013).  
Secondly, board diversity encompasses both “statutory” and “demographic” diversity. 
Statutory diversity “is mandated by law or best practices.” (Ben-Amar, Francoeur, Hafsi and 
Labelle, 2013, P 85). However, demographic diversity deals with directors’ characteristics that 
may affect their statutory diversity and as a result their performance (Ben-Amar et al. 2013). 
There is extensive research on statutory diversity, which mainly investigates board structure in 
terms of the directors’ independence from the management team (e.g. Klein, 2002b). However, 
research on demographic diversity is still in its infancy and limited to gender and ethnicity.  
Research on board demographic diversity provides evidence that the gender and ethnicity 
facets of diversity affect directors’ decision-making and as a result firm performance (e.g. 
Adams and Ferreira, 2009, Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2011). However, less is known about a 
dimension of diversity which may be even more important than gender and ethnicity; 
geographical diversity. The importance of this dimension originates from at least two reasons: 
first, there are increasing numbers of firms nominating directors from other geographical areas 
due to the improvement in technology and transportation in the last decades, which helps the 
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directors who are living far from firms to perform their duties more easily than before (Alam et 
al., 2012). Moreover, directors may not even need to travel and attend meetings; they can simply 
participate in board meetings by conference calls. Secondly, geographic diversity may affect 
other dimensions of diversity as well. Having a female or minority member on the board, who 
lives close to the firm, may have a different effect on firm performance than if one lives further 
away. Therefore, investigating the impact of geographic diversity on directors’ decision-making 
will shed light on at least two questions: whether geographic diversity actually affects directors’ 
decision-making and their performance? And, whether regulatory bodies need to consider any 
specific measures regarding mandating geographical diversity?  
Among the demographic diversity dimensions, there are few studies investigating 
geographic diversity and its effect on firm performance due to the lack of data about the 
residential addresses of directors (e.g. Alam et al., 2012, 2014). However, Canadian firms 
disclose the residential addresses of their directors in proxy circulars. This data availability 
provides an opportunity to investigate the geographic diversity of directors and how it impacts 
firm performance. 
Moreover, a Canadian setting is appropriate for this study since Canadian firms are more 
geographically diversified, measured by their business addresses, than U.S. firms. While U.S. 
firms nominate directors regionally, Canadian firms nominate board members intra-regionally. 
This is mainly due to a less-developed directors’ market in Canada than in the U.S. (O’Hagan 
and Green, 2004). O’Hagan, Rice and Green (2008) also find that Canadian firms hire board 
members from more geographically diverse areas, as measured by the university attended by 
board members, than U.S. firms that prefer to nominate board members who graduated from 
universities located in their regional areas. In addition, as the French language is the formal 
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language of Quebec, this may affect the board geographic diversity of Quebec firms. Along the 
same lines, firms located in Alberta may have a different board composition since almost all 
Canadian oil and gas companies are located there and therefore there is a rich pool of potential 
directors available for firms from which to choose. Thus, the Canadian setting is an appropriate 
choice for this study because of the availability of data and also the high variation in board 
geographical diversity. 
Empirical evidence regarding the impact of board geographic diversity on directors’ 
ability to perform their monitoring and advising roles is rare and the results are so far mixed. In 
this vein, Wan (2008) shows that directors living in close proximity to the firm they represent 
have access to more information which is reflected in their trading activities; however, they are 
not effective monitors of managers. Similarly, Alam et al. (2012) document that firms nominate 
non-local directors, when directors need less access to firm specific information. Moreover, 
Alam et al. (2014) find that after Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) the average distance between 
directors’ location and firm headquarters has increased and this in turn has caused directors to 
rely more on public information in their decision-making which is reflected in relying more on 
equity-based compensation. They argue that this in turn, gives managers more incentive to 
manage earnings which is shown in higher discretionary accruals. Masulis et al. (2012) 
investigate the presence of foreign directors in U.S. firms and provide evidence that firms with 
foreign directors exhibit lower performance. In addition, these firms are more likely to restate 
their earnings. The results of the study conducted by Wan (2008) is based on the idea that non-
local directors are more independent from managers and that they therefore do a better job of 
monitoring managers’ decision-making. Nonetheless, according to Masulis et al. 2012, in 
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assessing firm performance, it is difficult to distinguish the effect of directors’ geographical 
location from the impact of their non-familiarity with U.S regulations and business environment.  
Analyzing the effects of geography of directors on firms’ disclosure policies is even more 
complicated, since the impact of board geographic diversity on disclosure quality may be 
positive or negative. On the one hand, the geography literature documents that access to 
information is an advantage for local investors, creditors and analysts (e.g. Ayers, 
Ramalingegowd and Yeung, 2011, Arena and Dewally, 2012, Tan and O’Brien, 2013). Due to 
proximity, local stakeholders have a lower cost in acquiring information about a firm, which 
helps them in their decision-making. Similarly, local directors have access to local information, 
which in turn helps them perform their monitoring and advising roles more effectively (Alam et 
al. 2012). Local directors also have the opportunity to acquire information about a firm from 
channels such as the local media and face-to-face communication with employees, suppliers and 
executives (Coval and Moskwitz, 1999, 2001., Wan, 2008). But, for non-local directors, the cost 
of acquiring information is greater because of the higher cost of attending meetings and visiting 
firms’ locations (Masulis et al., 2012). Based on this explanation, a diversified board in terms of 
geography may not be able to monitor managers’ disclosure policies since directors who are far 
from firms do not have access to enough information.  
On the other hand, a diversified board may contribute to better disclosure quality for the 
following reasons. Non-local directors might be more independent from managers since they do 
not have day-to-day interactions and social connections with the management team (Coval and 
Moskwitz, 1999, 2001., Masulis et al. 2012). Therefore, they may better monitor managers’ 
disclosure’ policies. In addition, for a diversified board, access to information is costly, and as 
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such, they rely more on public disclosure (Armstrong et al, 2010). Thus, firms with a diversified 
board may have better disclosure quality to fulfill directors’ demand for information. 
To investigate the geographic diversity of directors and its effect on earnings quality, we 
use a sample of Canadian firms from the 2010 and 2011 fiscal years. The final sample contains 
528 firms for which data is available on Compustat and proxy circulars. Descriptive statistics 
show that firms located in Quebec and Alberta draw directors from a more concentrated 
geographic area than other Canadian firms. We use three measures for board geographic 
diversity: the percentage of audit committee members living in the same province where the 
headquarters are located, the percentage of directors living in the same province where the 
headquarters are located and the percentage of independent directors living in the same province 
where the headquarters are located. Based on all geographic diversity measures, there is a 
significant difference between the board geographic location of firms in Quebec and Alberta and 
the rest of the firms in the sample. This variation within a financial market with common 
institutional features provides an appropriate setting to investigate the effects of geographic 
diversity on earnings quality. 
In the next step, we measure earnings quality using the modified Jones model (Jones, 
1991) and earnings informativeness. Results of the multivariate analysis show that there is a 
negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors (audit committee 
members) who live in the same province where the headquarters are located and absolute 
abnormal accruals. In addition, the relationship between annual returns and earnings is higher for 
firms with a higher percentage of independent local directors (local audit committee members). 
These results provide support for a less diversified board in terms of geography and support the 
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argument that directors who live close to a firm’s headquarters end up being more effective at 
monitoring of their managers’ decision-making regarding earnings quality.  
The study contributes to three streams of research. First, this study provides evidence 
regarding a new dimension of board diversity which has rarely been explored before, i.e., 
geographic diversity (Alam et al., 2012, 2014, Masulis et al., 2012). So far, the effect of gender 
diversity on disclosure quality has been investigated (e.g. Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2011, Gul, 
Hutchinson and Lai, 2013). Yet, board diversity is not solely limited to gender diversity. Our 
study adds to the board diversity literature by providing evidence that the effects of different 
aspects of board diversity on earnings quality are not the same and regulators may need to take 
this in to consideration when they push for diversity. Our study also contributes to the literature 
that investigates the relationship between board composition and corporate transparency (e.g. 
Armstrong et al. 2010). This line of the literature mainly focuses on the statutory diversity of 
directors (directors’ independence) and its effects on the information environment. Our study 
contributes to this literature by investigating a new dimension of demographic diversity, location 
of directors, and its impact on earnings quality. Finally, it adds to the geography literature and its 
effects on stakeholders’ decision-making by providing evidence that proximate directors do a 
better job at monitoring managers, similar to proximate institutional investors and proximate 
analysts (e.g. Ayers et al, 2011, Tan and O’Brien, 2013). 
 
2.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.2.1. Diversity a Multi-Dimensional Reality 
Board of directors play an important role in monitoring and advising managers and 
aligning their interests with the interests of shareholders (e.g. Armstrong et al, 2010). To 
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understand the factors that affect directors’ ability to perform these roles, there is a handful of 
research investigating directors’ characteristics that may affect their performance (e.g. 
Armstrong et al, 2010). These studies investigate differences in directors’ characteristics in terms 
of what is mandated by law, such as independence, and what is not mandated such as age, 
experience and gender. More research has been done regarding mandated facets of board 
diversity such as independence (e.g. Klein, 2002). However, less is known about the effects of 
demographic diversity on directors’ performance. 
A comprehensive definition of diversity, as provided by U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commissioner, Luis A. Aguilar, state that “there still remains a need to highlight the importance 
of diversity in the boardroom. Diversity can mean variety of thoughts, geography, age, career 
experience as well as the more traditional categories of gender and ethnicity”: (SEC 
Commissioner, Luis A. Aguilar, 2010). Considering the board of directors as a group of people 
working together, most of the studies rely mainly on research in psychology and management 
that show that a diversified board may work better and make better decisions due to different 
personal characteristics and backgrounds (e.g. Erhardt et al, 2003). 
Among the dimensions of demographic diversity, more research has been done about the 
traditional categories of gender and ethnicity (e.g. Adams and Ferreira, 2009). However, the 
geography dimension has been explored in few studies probably due to a lack of data for the 
location of directors (e.g. Wan, 2008, Alam et al, 2012, 2014). This aspect may be even more 
important than gender and ethnicity since it is becoming more prevalent among board members, 
due to an improvement in technology and transportation, which in turn help directors to perform 
their jobs even if they do not live in the proximity of a firm (Alam et al, 2012). Secondly, 
geographic diversity may affect other dimensions of diversity such as gender and ethnicity. The 
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reason is that this dimension is directly related to information accessible to directors, which in 
turn may affect their performance when it comes to monitoring and advising managers (Alam et 
al, 2012). Even a female director or a minority member’s effectiveness on the board is directly 
based on how much information they have access to and how independent they are. These two 
key factors are directly related to the distance from a firm (Alam et al, 2012).  
Boards of directors, as corporate governance mechanisms affect managers’ decision-
making regarding different aspects of a firm’s performance such as financial reporting (Srinidhi 
et al, 2011). For example, firms with a higher percentage of independent directors have a 
superior earnings quality and a better information environment (e.g. Armstrong et al, 2010). 
Besides the traditional measure of diversity, independence, demographic diversity also affects 
firms’ disclosure quality. For example, firms with female directors have higher earnings quality 
and analysts issue more precise forecasts for such firms (e.g. Srinidhi et al, 2011, Gul et al, 
2013). As for geographic diversity, the effects on earnings quality are not clear since geography 
may have a positive, negative or no effect on directors’ ability to perform their roles. Therefore, 
investigating the effects of board geographic diversity on earnings quality will shed light on 
whether such a facet of diversity will contribute to a firm’s performance and what position 
regulators should take regarding this dimension. 
 
2.2.2. Geographical Diversity and Decision-Making by Market Participants 
In contrast to prior research in corporate governance which completely disregards the 
geographic diversity’s potential influence on board’ effectiveness and actions, geography is an 
important factor underlying decision-making by important stakeholder groups such as investors 
and analysts. For instance, investors typically prefer to invest in local firms and, on average, earn 
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higher returns from such investments compared with investments in non-local firms (Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner, 2005). Mutual funds invest more in local firms as well and earn abnormal returns 
especially when investing in local small and leveraged firms (Coval and Moskwitz, 1999, 2001). 
The documented local bias is due to the information advantage that local investors hold against 
non-local investors. Local investors have the opportunity to acquire information directly from 
employees, managers and suppliers and they may have social ties with executives that give them 
an information advantage over non-local investors (Coval and Moskwitz, 1999, 2001).  
In addition, local investors, due to their information advantage over non-local investors 
are able to fulfill their monitoring role over management more effectively. Ayers et al. (2011), 
using a sample of firms covering the 1996-2008 period, document that local institutional 
investors are better monitors than non-local ones. More specifically, firms with a higher 
percentage of local institutional investors have less financial reporting discretion, measured by 
abnormal accruals. Ayers et al. (2011) attribute this finding to the cost of acquiring information, 
which is lower for local institutional investors. Local institutional investors attenuate managers’ 
propensity to engage in opportunistic financial reporting, especially for firms with more 
investment opportunities. Similarly, Chhaochharia, Kumar and Niessen-Ruenzi (2012), find that 
firms with high local institutional ownership have better corporate governance. They are more 
profitable, have more independent directors, less earnings management and less option 
backdating. Also, they are less likely to be a target of class action lawsuits. Local institutional 
investors are more effective in monitoring management through mechanisms such as introducing 
shareholder proposals, reducing CEO compensation and increasing CEO turnover. The 
monitoring power of local institutional investors arises from their access to more private 
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information through formal and informal daily interactions with employees and managers 
(Chhaochharia et al., 2012). 
A similar local information advantage also exists for equity analysts. Tan and O’Brien 
(2013) provide evidence that analysts are 60% more likely to cover a local firm in IPO settings. 
In addition, local analysts begin to cover local firms one to three weeks earlier than non-local 
ones. This early attention increases analysts’ coverage and institutional investment as it reduces 
the information asymmetry between the firm and markets, which is typically fairly high in the 
context of an IPO. Molloy (2005) documents that earnings forecasts issued by local analysts are 
more precise and have a higher impact on the market, especially for firms located in remote 
areas. Hence, it does appear that proximate analysts have an information advantage over other 
analysts. 
Local information advantage also has an effect on creditors’ decisions. Arena and 
Dewally (2012) find that firms located in rural areas and small cities have a higher cost of debt 
and are less able to attract large underwriters and lending banks. Consequently, rural firms 
borrow from the same local banks repeatedly because of this information disadvantage. In sum, 
stakeholders located in proximity to a firm have access to information through channels which 
are not accessible to stakeholders who are located far from a firm.  
 
2.2.3. Geographical Diversity and Corporate Governance 
As for the geography of directors, due to a lack of data for the residential addresses of 
directors there are few studies that examine the effects of the geographical diversity of directors 
on their performance. Therefore, it is not clear whether board geographical diversity has a 
negative or positive impact on firms’ earnings quality. 
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Evidence provided by Wan (2008) shows that local directors hold an information 
advantage over non-local ones as reflected in their trading behaviors. However, it appears that 
they are not effective monitors on managers. The data has been collected for the locations of 
directors using the Thomson Reuters Insider Database (Form 144), but this database only 
provides the addresses of directors who have traded, and in most of the cases the addresses 
happen to be their business addresses. Alam et al. (2012), using the residential addresses of more 
than 4000 directors in the U.S., investigate the determinants of nominating non-local directors. 
They document that firms have more non-local independent directors when board members need 
less of the firm’s specific information in their decision-making. Alam et al (2014) investigate the 
effect of the SOX on the distance between directors and firm headquarters. They find that after 
the SOX, the average distance between directors sitting on monitoring committees and firm 
headquarters has increased and this in turn, has caused directors to rely more on public 
information which is evident in higher level of equity- based compensation. They argue that this 
in turn, may give managers incentives to manage earnings, which is reflected in higher 
discretionary accruals. In the same vein, Masulis et al. (2012) examine the effects of foreign 
directors on U.S. firms. They find that firms with foreign directors exhibit lower performance 
and are more likely to have earnings restatements. Nevertheless, the result of the Masulis et al. 
(2012) study is hard to interpret when it comes to geography, as foreign directors may not be 
effective monitors either because they are located far away (geography-based information 






2.2.4. Geographic Diversity of Directors and the Quality of Earnings 
The impact of board geographical diversity on a firm’s earnings quality is complex. On 
the one hand, a diversified board may be associated with better earnings quality. The reason for 
this is that non-local directors may be more independent, due to their direct and indirect rare 
interactions in daily life with managers (Coval and Moskwitz, 1999, 2001., Masulis et al. 2012). 
Such distance may help them to monitor managers’ decision-making, including disclosure 
policies, more soundly. In addition, due to the higher cost of gathering information for non-local 
directors they may rely more on public disclosure to fulfill their monitoring and advising roles 
(Armstrong et al, 2010). Therefore, they have a higher demand for transparency which may lead 
to better earnings quality: 
 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between board geographic diversity and  
the earnings quality of firms 
 
On the other hand, a geographically diversified board may have a negative effect on 
earnings quality. Directors may not be able to acquire information about a firm because of their 
diversified locations, since they do not have the day-to-day social interactions with the local 
community to acquire soft information about the firm (Coval and Moskwitz, 1999, 2001). In 
addition, attending meetings and visiting a firm’s location are costly for them (Masulis et al. 
2012). Therefore, they may not be able to monitor disclosure policies due to a lack of 





H1b: There is a negative relationship between board geographic diversity and the  
earnings quality of firms 
 
2.3. Focus on a Canadian Setting 
Three reasons underlie the decision to choose Canadian firms to investigate board 
geographic diversity and its effect on firms’ disclosure quality. 
First, Canadian firms disclose the residential addresses of their directors in proxy 
circulars, as it is mandated by securities markets regulators. Secondly, the geography of Canada 
is unique: Canada is a wide country and being a neighbor to the U.S. provides a rich pool of 
directors for Canadian firms to choose from, as both countries share a common language 
(English) and similar business practices. As a result, Canadian firms have access to both 
Canadian and American pools of directors. This in turn, helps Canadian firms have a 
geographically diversified board. For example, O’Hagan and Green (2004) document that 
Canadian boards are more diversified than U.S. boards. U.S. firms nominate directors regionally, 
but Canadian firms nominate directors intra-regionally. In the same vein, O’Hagan et al. (2008) 
document that Canadian firms are more geographically diversified than U.S. firms, measured by 
the university attended by directors. 
Third, within Canada is the province of Quebec, where French is the primary language of 
business. The language may contribute to the decision by Quebec firms not to nominate board 
members from outside Quebec due to language distance. Previous research shows that firms 
nominate outside directors when information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders is low 
(Armstrong et al. 2010). Therefore, Quebec firms may prefer to nominate directors from Quebec 
because of information asymmetry associated with language. Also, due to this information 
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asymmetry, non-Quebec directors may not be willing to sit on the board of Quebec firms since 
information asymmetry associated with language reduces their access to information. Therefore, 
firms located in Quebec may have a different geographic diversity than firms located in the rest 
of Canada. In addition, Alberta is the location for almost all oil and gas firms in Canada which 
provides a unique pool of directors for firms located in Alberta from which to choose. This 
variation provides an appropriate setting to investigate the effects of geographic diversity on the 
earnings quality of firms. 
 
2.4. Research Design  
2.4.1. Sample and data 
The sample is based on Canadian firms in Compustat for the fiscal years ending 2010 and 
2011. We start with Canadian firms in Compustat for the fiscal year 2010. Then, we eliminate 
firms in financial industries (SIC-Code 6021-6999), incorporated outside Canada and firms with 
headquarters outside Canada. We also exclude firms on the Venture Toronto Stock Exchange 
since they are small and are subject to different filing requirements. We also eliminate 
investment trusts since they have different tax and dividend regulations. Also, 481 observations 
are removed due to a lack of data for financial variables in Compustat. Small firms (with market 
capital below $10 million) are excluded too. Eleven firms with negative equity are excluded as 
well. Finally, 141 firms are excluded as there are fewer than six observations in their industries 
for which to calculate abnormal accruals. 
Next, we collect governance data from proxy statements. Data from Annual information 
forms and proxy circulars filled by Canadian companies are from SEDAR. For missing 
information we use ‘The Directory of Directors’ which is a database including the personal 
information of directors in Canada. For 26 firms, the data from proxy circulars is not complete; 
23 
 
therefore we eliminate them from the sample. Lastly, there are 290 firms for year end 2010 with 
complete data. 
Then we collect the data for these firms in 2011. We have 238 firms for the year 2011 
with complete data, because of delisting and missing variables in Compustat and proxy circulars. 
In total, sample consists of 528 firm-year observations. Table 1 panel A shows the sample 
selection process. 
To investigate earnings informativeness, we collect stock price data from the CFMRC 
database. Stock price data are missing for 34 firms. Therefore, the final sample for earnings 
informativeness consists of 494 firm-year observations. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 panel A shows the distribution of the sample based on industry and location. In a 
few cases where the headquarters and executive office of a firm are located in different cities, we 
choose the executive office, since board meetings are usually held in the executive office. While 
the headquarters of 34% of the firms are located in Ontario, 28% are located in Alberta; British 
Colombia and Quebec have 18% and 15% of the firms respectively. The remaining 5% of the 
firms are located in Manitoba, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Saskatchewan. As for industry 
distribution, 24% of the firms are in the oil and gas industry from which 90% are located in 
Calgary. Twenty-three percent of the firms are in the metal mining industry from which 45% are 
located in Ontario and 36% are located in British Colombia. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
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2.4.2. Measurement of Board Geographic Diversity 
The variable of interest for board composition is based on the residential addresses of 
directors. For each firm, we calculate the proportion of audit committee members who live in the 
same province where the headquarters are located. This measure is a better proxy of the 
geographical diversity of directors for this study, since we investigate the effects of board 
composition on earnings quality, an outcome for which the audit committee plays an important 
role. The second measure is the proportion of independent directors who live inside the province 
and the last measure is the proportion of directors who live inside the province in which the 
headquarters is located.  
 
2.4.3. Measurement of Abnormal Accruals 
To measure earnings quality, we use the modified Jones model (Jones, 1991) as presented 
by Dechow et al. (1995): 
    
          
    
 
          
    
      
          
    
     
          
          
     
          
     
  
Where      is the firm’s total accruals in industry two-digit code, measured as net 
income before extraordinary items minus operating cash flow.            is the firm’s i total 
assets in year t-1 and two-digit SIC code j.        is the change in revenue from the previous 
year for firm i in two-digit SIC code j.       is the gross property, plant and equipment for firm i 
in two-digit SIC code j.      is the book value to market value of equity for firm i in two-digit 
SIC code and       is cash flow from the operating activity for firm i in two-digit SIC code. We 







          
    
            
          
    
     
          
          
     
          
 
 
Where       is the change in accounts receivables from the previous year for firm i in 
two-digit SIC code j. The measure for discretionary accrual is the absolute value of the 
difference between total accruals and predicted normal accruals. We winsorize all the variables 




 percentiles to prevent the effect of outliers. 
 
2.4.4. Measurement of Earnings Informativeness 
Using accrual quality as a measure of earnings quality may not take in to account the 
costing method used in the oil, gas and mining industries, considering almost half of the sample 
firms are in these industries. As a consequence, we also use a market measure for earnings 
quality to make sure my results are robust vis-à-vis an alternate measure. Moreover, it provides 
evidence on how market participants perceive the effects of board geographical diversity on the 
performance of directors. If local directors are perceived to have more monitoring power on 
managers’ decision-making about disclosure quality then we expect to find higher earnings 
informativeness for firms with greater percentage of local directors.  
 
To measure earning informativness we estimate the following model 
 
                                                            




Return is the 12-months’ stock return of firm i in period t, starting nine months prior to 
the fiscal year-end and ends three months after the fiscal year-end. EPS is the earnings per share 
of firm i in period t divided by the stock price nine months before the fiscal year-end. We also 
control for other factors which may affect the association between return and earnings. We 
include firm size, leverage, book to market, the factor analysis of governance variables and a 
dummy variable for loss.    measures differential earnings informativeness based on the 
geographical diversity of directors.  
 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the whole sample and is also based 
on each province.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
 
Since 95% of the firms in our sample are located in Alberta, Ontario, British Colombia 
and Quebec, we present the comparison between these four provinces here. The mean of board 
size is 7.85 in the sample which is almost the same across the four provinces except for Quebec 
which has an average of 8.43. The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors has a 
mean of 11.34%. British Colombia has a minimum average of 7.52% among the provinces and 
Quebec has the highest mean at 14.42%. The percentage of local institutional investors has a 
mean of 4.41%. British Colombia, with 0.87% local institutional investors, has the minimum 
average and Quebec with 7.97% has the maximum average of local institutional investors among 
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the provinces. The mean of the percentage of the shares owned by family members or individuals 
is 9.79%. Again, Quebec has the highest percentage of family ownership (17.18%) and Alberta 
has the minimum average among the provinces (5.81%). The mean of the number of directors on 
the audit committee has an average of 3.48 which is similar across all provinces. CEO tenure has 
an average of 8.79 years. The CEOs of Quebec firms have the highest tenure (10.64) and the 
CEOs of firms in Alberta have the lowest tenure among the provinces (7.53). The average of the 
number of other directorships is 1.34. However, directors in Alberta have an average of 1.58 and 
firms in Quebec have a minimum average of 1.02 among the four provinces. The mean of board 
tenure is 7.56 years. Quebec directors have the highest tenure, 9.33 years, and Alberta directors 
have the lowest at 6.60. The mean of the fraction of independent directors is equal to 0.74 of the 
board size which is almost similar among the four provinces. In 22% of the firms, the CEO is 
also the chairman and the average is almost similar across the provinces. On average 8% of the 
sample firms have dual class shares, but, Quebec firms have the highest percentage of firms with 
dual class shares (20%) and firms in British Colombia have the lowest percentage at 2%. Six 
percent of the directors are female and Quebec has the highest female representation (9%) on the 
board and Alberta has the lowest (4%). Finally, 91% of the firms are audited by the BIG4. 
As for geography variables, in general, 65% of the directors of the sample firms live in 
the same province where the headquarters are located. Alberta and Quebec have the highest 
percentage of directors in the same province (75% and 76% respectively). Ontario and British 
Colombia with 62% and 52% respectively fall after Quebec and Alberta. 
Fourteen percent of the directors of the sample firms live in a province other than where 
their headquarters are located. It ranges from Alberta with the lowest percentage at 10 to British 
Colombia and Quebec with the highest percentage at 14. Fourteen percent of the directors live in 
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the U.S. Seven percent of the directors of firms in Quebec live in the U.S. and 22% of the 
directors of firms in British Colombia are located in the U.S. Finally, 7% of the directors live 
outside of Canada. Similarly, Quebec with 3% and British Colombia with 12% have the lowest 
and highest percentage of foreign directors (other than the U.S.) among the four provinces, 
respectively. 
Sixty-one percent of the independent directors live in the same province as where the 
headquarters are located. Among the four provinces, Quebec and Alberta, with 73% and 71% 
have the highest percentage of independent directors living in the same province as where the 
headquarters are located and British Colombia has the lowest percentage (47%). Ontario falls in 
between with 60%. Eighteen percent of the independent directors live in another province than 
where the headquarters are located. Alberta has the lowest representation of independent 
directors from other provinces (13%) and British Colombia has the highest representation (18%). 
Fifteen percent of the independent directors live in the U.S. Quebec firms have the lowest 
percentage of independent directors from the U.S. (9%) and British Colombia has the highest 
percentage of independent directors from the U.S. (23%). Finally, 6% of the independent 
directors live outside of Canada (other than the U.S.). However, only 2% of the independent 
directors in Quebec live outside of Canada, whereas that figure is 12% of the directors of firms 
located in British Colombia. 
The average percentage of audit committee members living in the same province where 
their headquarters are located is 63%. Alberta and Quebec have the highest percentage among 
provinces (72% and 78% respectively) and British Colombia with 48% has the minimum 
average among provinces. Ontario with 62% is close to the average of the sample.  
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As for firm characteristics, Twenty-five percent of the firms are cross-listed in the U.S. 
Quebec and Alberta have 16% and 18% of the firms cross-listed in the U.S. and British 
Colombia and Ontario with 42% and 27% respectively follow suit. Firm size proxied by 
logarithm of total assets is 2.56 equivalents to around $363 million. Firms in Alberta are larger 
than firms in other provinces (2.72). The mean of leverage (LEV) as measured by total liabilities 
divided by total assets is 0.37. The mean of performance (ROA) proxied by net income divided 
by total assets is -0.005. In the same vein, 37% of the sample firms have reported a loss. The 
average of the absolute abnormal accruals calculated based on the Modified Jones model is 0.05. 
Quebec has the minimum (0.036) and British Colombia has the maximum (0.065) amount of 
abnormal accruals. The average annual return for the sample is 0.10. Lastly, the average of the 
earnings per share scaled by the lagged stock price is -0.006. 
Table 4 panel A shows the correlation between governance and geography variables and 
panel B presents the correlation between variables that will enter in to the regression of accruals 
quality. The earnings quality (ACCRUAL) is negatively correlated with measures of the 
geographical diversity which is significant at 5% and 10%. The governance factor is negatively 
correlated with the abnormal accruals and is significant at 1%. Size and leverage are negatively 
correlated with abnormal accruals. Having loss is positively correlated with abnormal accruals 
and ROA is also negatively correlated with abnormal accruals. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 





2.5.2. Multivariate Analysis 
2.5.2.1. Accrual Quality 
In the first multivariate analysis, we regress the earnings quality, as measured by the 
abnormal accruals, on board geographic diversity measures and control variables. We control for 
firms’ characteristics that are associated with earnings quality, according to prior research: firm 
size, leverage, change in revenues, reporting of a loss, change in cash flow from operating 
activities and change in net income. We also control for incorporation law, since Filip et al. 
(2014) show that firms incorporated under Quebec incorporation law and located in Quebec have 
better earnings quality than firms incorporated under the Canadian Business Corporation Act 
(CBCA). We also control for governance variables at the firm level. Based on a factor analysis 
on governance variables we use the first factor which has the most explanatory power with an 
eigenvalue higher than 1. Table 5 panel A shows the loading components of the factors loaded 
on the first factor. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 6 provides results from the regression analysis using three measures of board 
geographic diversity. The first regression shows results based on the proportion of directors 
living inside the province. This variable has a negative relationship with abnormal accruals but is 
not significant (-0.014). The second regression presents the results for the proportion of 
independent directors living in the same province which is negative and significant (-0.020, p-
value < 0.05). The third regression shows the findings for the proportion of audit committee 
members living in the same province, and the coefficient is statistically significant (-0.014, p-
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value < 0.05). For the control variables, the effects of size, change in cash flow from operating 
activity and ROA are significant and in line with previous studies. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
2.5.2.2. Earnings Informativeness 
In next step, we calculate earnings informativeness by regressing the annual return on 
earnings per share and the geography variables. Table 4 panel C shows the correlation table for 
the variables that enter into this model. The correlation between the annual returns and the 
interaction between the EPS and geography variables are positive and significant at 1%. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 PANEL C ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 7 shows the results for earnings informativeness model.  
The relationship between the annual returns and earnings is stronger for firms with a 
higher percentage of directors living in the same province where the headquarters are located 
(1.994, P-value <0.10). In addition, firms with a higher percentage of independent directors 
living in the same province where the headquarters are located have a greater earnings response 
coefficient (2.24, P-Value <0.05). The results for the audit committee members are positive and 
significant too (1.56, P-Value <0.05). 
 




Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that a less diversified board in terms of 
geography has better monitoring power over managers’ decision-making regarding earnings 
quality. 
 
2.6. Robustness Analysis 
There are some concerns regarding my findings in terms of methodological and 
conceptual issues. First of all, the findings support the existence of a relationship between 
earnings quality and directors’ geographic diversity and not a causal relationship. Two common 
ways to deal with endogeneity problem are change analysis and using instrumental variables. 
Using change analysis is not appropriate for my sample, since it covers two consecutive years 
and geography variables are almost constant throughout this period. Furthermore, finding the 
right instrument which is correlated with geographic diversity and not with earnings quality is 
difficult. We have used several variables such as foreign operations, cross-listing, intangible 
assets and ownership as instrument, but they do not meet the conditions for an appropriate 
instrument. Therefore, one limitation of this study is that we cannot establish a causal 
relationship between earnings quality and board of directors’ geographical diversity at this stage. 
The question arises then as to what point does it make sense to localize a board. Does 
having full board members from the same area make a board efficient in monitoring managers or 
is there a threshold for that? To test for this possibility (non-linear relationship) we add a 
quadratic form to the regressions and we do not find any non-linear relationship between the 
board of directors’ geographic diversity and earnings quality. 
The next concern has to do with the governance factor analysis. Since this variable is 
very aggregate, there exists the possibility that what we capture are the effects of some 
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governance variables such as ownership that are highly correlated with the board of directors’ 
geographic diversity. To address this issue we add governance variables to the regression instead 
of using factor analysis. The geography variables are still significant in all regressions: the 
percentage of directors living in the same province is negative and significant (-0.017, p-value 
<0.10). The percentage of independent local directors and audit committee members are also 
significant (-0.025, p-value <0.01, -0.018, p-value <0.05). In earning informativeness regressions 
the results are still valid as well (p-value <0.01, p-value <0.01, p-value <0.01 respectively). 
We also control for location of the firms. Firms located in rural areas may have lower 
percentage of local directors due to less availability of directors to choose from and at the same 
time they may have higher disclosure quality to attract non-local investors (Urcan, 2007). We use 
a dummy variable which is equal to 0 for firms located in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British 
Colombia and 1 otherwise. The results still hold after controlling for firms’ locations and this 
dummy variable is negative and significant in the regressions of accruals quality. 
As another sensitivity analysis we run the regression for the discretionary accruals for the 
subsamples of positive and negative accruals. For the percentage of independent directors who 
live in the same province where the headquarters is located, the results hold for both subsamples 
(-0.015, p-value <0.1 for positive accruals and -0.024, p-value <0.1 for negative accruals). As for 
the percentage of audit committee members who live in the same province where the 
headquarters is located the results hold for positive discretionary accruals (-0.016, p-value<0.05 
for positive accruals). As another robustness check, we use a factor analysis of the three 
measures for geographical diversity. The results are still significant for both models (-0.005, p-




2.7. Conclusion and Discussion 
Boards of directors play an important role in monitoring and advising managers, ensuring 
that their interests align with the interests of shareholders. Therefore, there are actually a handful 
of studies that investigate the determinants of board composition, which in turn help directors to 
fulfill their monitoring and advising roles (Armstrong et al. 2010). The common dimension of 
board structure is based on their relationship with the firm: independent and non-independent. 
Independent directors are considered effective monitors of managers since they do not have ties 
to the firms. But, because of their limited ability to access a firm’s specific information, they 
may not be able to perform their monitoring and advising roles effectively (Armstrong et al. 
2010). 
However, less is known about the demographic composition of boards, especially the 
location of directors, due to a lack of data. In this study, using a unique Canadian setting, we find 
a negative relationship between board geographic diversity and earnings quality, i.e. firms with 
boards exhibiting less geographic diversity (more local directors) have higher earnings quality.  
The results of this study contribute to the board diversity literature by examining a new 
dimension of diversity; the location of directors. The geography dimension of diversity has a 
negative effect on directors monitoring over managers’ decision-making regarding earnings 
quality. Also, the results contribute to the stream of literature investigating the relationship 
between board composition and disclosure quality (e.g. Armstrong et al. 2010), by shedding light 
on a facet of demographic diversity which has been explored in few studies before (Alam et al, 
2012, 2014). Finally, it contributes to the literature related to the impact of geography on 
decision-making by different stakeholders. Proximate directors do a better job in monitoring 
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managers, similar to proximate creditors, institutional investors and analysts (e.g. Ayers et al, 

























Chapter 3: Do Foreign Directors on Audit Committees Enhance Financial Reporting 
Quality?  
Abstract 
With many firms expanding the global scope of their operations, the appointment of foreign 
directors certainly appears to be a positive governance development as it enhances a board 
diversity in terms of expertise, experiences and backgrounds. However, a potential drawback is 
that they also are far removed from the information networks emanating from a firm’s 
headquarters and main operations. In this study, we investigate how foreign directors on the audit 
committee perform when it comes to monitoring the decisions made by managers regarding 
financial reporting. We rely on the unique context provided by Canada in which companies have 
access to a large pool of U.S. directors, a country with which it shares many similarities and is 
geographically close. Results show that 45% of sample firms have at least one foreign director 
on the audit committee, with 69% of these firms nominating directors residing in the U.S. In 
addition, firms with foreign directors on their audit committee have lower earnings quality, both 
in terms of accruals and informativeness. In this regard, U.S. directors play a major role as the 
presence of non-U.S. foreign directors does not seem to relate to earnings quality. Our study 
contributes to the current literature on foreign directors by providing evidence that having 
directors from a country with many similarities may not necessarily compensate for foreign 
directors being far from a firm and not being able to monitor the decision-making of managers. 
This finding is in contrast to studies that find that foreign directors from countries with 
similarities will do a better job on boards in comparison to other foreign directors. Moreover, the 
rules-based approach of Canada with respect to audit committee membership may also contribute 
to the high presence of foreign directors on the audit committee, and in turn, to its negative 
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consequences on their performance. Firms may nominate foreign directors for the purpose of 

























The appointment of foreign directors is a current trend among firms from all over the 
world. For instance, according to the Spencer Stuart Board Index report, the percentage of 
foreign directors in U.S. companies has increased from 6.4% in 2008 to almost 9% in 2012. In 
Canada, the percentage has risen from 18% in 2008 to 22% in the year 2012. Additionally, in 
2013, more than half of the 200 firms in the S&P 500 had at least one foreign director. During 
the same year, 34% of the newly appointed directors in Canada were from outside the country, 
many of them from the U.S.
2
, a level that is almost twice as high as the 18% reached in 2008. 
(Spencer Stuart Board Index, the U.S. and Canada, 2008, 2012, 2013). 
Despite the globalization of boards of directors, there are few studies that investigate if 
and how foreign directors contribute to a firm’s performance or other outcomes. Among the 
studies that do investigate this relationship, results are so far mixed. On the one hand, Oxelheim 
and Randoy (2003) find that firms located in Norway and Sweden with Anglo-American 
directors exhibit higher firm value. They argue that the enhancement in firm value is due to 
exposure to the Anglo-American governance system. On the other hand, Masulis, Wang and Xie 
(2012) find that for firms located in the U.S., having foreign directors is associated with lower 
firm performance. However, foreign directors contribute to the board in specific cases such as 
advising on mergers and acquisitions in the home country of the foreign directors. Along the 
same lines, Miletkov, Poulsen and Wintoki (2013) find similar results by using a sample of non-
U.S. firms. Yet, Miletkov et al. argue that as the language, culture and physical distance between 
                                                          
2
 “Going outside Canada for director talent has played a significant part in the renewal and succession strategies of 
the boards of many leading Canadian companies. To a significant degree, boards have been fulfilling a range of their 
needs (e.g. CEO experience plus relevant industry background and/or “on the ground” market knowledge; functional 
experience or diversity) by going beyond our borders. On average, close to 30% of all CSSBI100 directors 
appointed during the past six years have been individuals residing outside Canada.” (Canadian Spencer Stuart Board 
Index, 2010, p 5) 
39 
 
foreign directors and the firm decreases, the negative effects consequently subside. They also 
find that when foreign directors come from a country with developed capital markets and strong 
legal institutions, then negative effects on the corporation’s performance decline. 
Oxelheim, Gregoric, Randoy and Thomsen (2013) argue that the mixed findings 
regarding the effects of foreign directors on firm performance can be investigated further by 
looking one step back and by examining how prevalent the presence of foreign directors is in 
companies and the various reasons behind nominating them. Moreover, as Miletkov et al. (2013) 
argue, due to a rich pool of directors in the U.S. and the high quality of governance mechanisms, 
U.S. firms may not need to rely on directors from outside of the U.S. Therefore, any 
generalization of the study on U.S. firms to other countries may not be appropriate. 
In fact, the prevalence and composition of foreign directors do differ in countries around 
the world. For instance, in the U.S. in 2012, the U.K., Canada and India provide 16%, 14% and 
12% of the foreign directors respectively and the rest are from more than ten other countries (The 
Spencer Stuart Board Index, The U.S., 2012). However, in Canada, the composition is 
completely different: 76% are from the U.S., 7% from the U.K., 6% from Europe and the rest 
from Asia, Latin America and Australia (The Spencer Stuart Board Index Canada, 2012). This 
unique composition makes the Canadian setting appropriate enough in investigating how the 
nomination of directors from a country with similarities in many respects such as economic 
development, financial markets, culture and language impact the performance of directors. 
A board of directors, as a corporate governance mechanism, performs two main duties in 
firms: monitoring and advising managers’ decision-making, most notably in terms of financial 
reporting (Armstrong, Guay and Weber, 2010). In this regard, a board’s audit committee is 
directly responsible for monitoring the financial reporting quality of firms. “An audit committee 
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is a committee of a board of directors to which the board delegates its responsibilities for 
oversight of the financial reporting process.” (Canadian Securities Administrators, Multilateral 
Instrument 52-110, p. 13) In Canada, a rules–based approach has been taken regarding the 
membership of an audit committee in 2004. Independence and financial expertise are the two 
main requirements indicated in MI-52-110 for audit committee members. These requirements 
may force Canadian firms to seek beyond Canada’s borders to find qualified audit committee 
members in terms of independence and expertise. Thus, how the presence of foreign directors on 
an audit committee may impact its monitoring performance is an empirical question. 
On the one hand, due to the fact that they are likely less hindered by issues such as 
distance, cost of travelling or non-familiarity with the rules and regulations (Masulis et al, 2012), 
American directors may be able to perform their monitoring role more effectively than their 
colleagues from other countries when serving on Canadian boards. On the other hand, although 
U.S. directors evolve in an environment that shares many similarities with Canada, board 
members are typically busy individuals who often have principal occupations (Armstrong et al. 
2010). Moreover, when directors reside far from a firm, they do not have access to soft 
information, which in turn, may impair their monitoring power over managers (Coval and 
Moskwitz, 1999, 2001). For this reason, even being in the U.S. may not help them in effectively 
monitoring managers’ decision-making regarding disclosure quality, although they may have 
financial expertise. Also, research in psychology provides evidence that a diverse group has a 
better performance, due to the different expertise, talents and characteristics of the group 
members (e.g. Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader, 2003). When we apply this to the audit committee, 
having foreign members from a country like the U.S. which shares many similarities with 
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Canada, does not necessarily contribute to board performance. Thus, U.S. directors may not do a 
better job on the audit committee than their colleagues from other countries. 
Based on a sample of Canadian firms in the 2010 and 2011 fiscal years, we investigate 
the relation between the presence of foreign directors on the audit committee and earnings 
quality. We find that, on average, 45% of Canadian firms in the sample have at least one foreign 
director, with 69% of these firms nominating directors from the U.S. In the next stage, we 
investigate the monitoring performance of foreign directors on the audit committee through 
earnings quality. Firms with foreign directors on the audit committee have lower earnings 
quality, as measured by the absolute value of abnormal accruals and earnings informativeness. 
This result is in line with previous studies that find a negative relationship between firm 
performance and the presence of foreign independent directors (Masulis et al, 2012, Miletkov et 
al. 2013). However, when we separate the foreign directors into U.S. directors and non-U.S. 
foreign directors, we find that only the presence of directors residing in the U.S. relates with 
lower earnings quality. These findings undermine the argument that hiring directors from 
countries with many similarities will mitigate the downside risk of foreign directors, at least 
regarding monitoring disclosure quality. 
This study contributes to the literature regarding the impact of foreign directors on the 
performance of boards (Masulis et al. 2012). Primarily, considering the extent of foreign 
ownership and foreign presence on boards, this is the first Canadian evidence on how the 
presence of foreign directors relates with firm performance, as reflected by earnings quality. 
Secondly, our study is the first to investigate how the presence of foreign directors on the audit 
committee potentially affects its monitoring performance regarding earnings quality. Thirdly, it 
contributes to the board diversity literature, by providing evidence that hiring foreign directors 
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with many similarities may not necessarily contribute to enhance a board’s performance (e.g. 
Srinidhi, Gul and Tsui, 2011). Lastly, it provides insight about the limitations of rule-driven 
board diversity regulations (both statutory and demographic diversities). Firms may go beyond 
borders to meet the demographic and statutory diversities indicated in the regulations, but these 
in turn, may have negative effects on the performance of directors. 
 
3.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.2.1. Foreign Directors and Firm Performance 
Foreign directors, as an important class of directors, are getting much attention in the 
academic and business communities. The uniqueness of this class of directors comes from their 
ties to another country that in turn may bring new knowledge and expertise to the board (Masulis 
et al. 2012). However, there are costs associated with their presence such as travelling expenses, 
distance and their non-familiarity with the country in which they are sitting on a board (Masulis 
et al. 2012, Miletkov et al. 2013). Therefore, the impact of having them on a board is so far not 
clear. 
A few studies that do investigate the impact of foreign directors on firm performance 
provide mixed results to date. Oxelheim and Randoy, 2003, investigate the presence of Anglo-
American directors on the boards of firms in Norway and Sweden. They find that firms with 
outside Anglo-American directors have a higher performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. They 
argue that this improvement comes as a result of exposing to “Anglo-American corporate 
governance” system. 
Masulis et al. (2012) investigate the presence of foreign directors in U.S. firms during the 
period from 1998-2006. They argue that foreign directors may do a good job in advising 
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managers. Nevertheless, they may not be beneficial in monitoring the decision-making of 
managers. Consistent with this notion, they find that foreign directors provide favourable 
advisory roles for companies that have mergers and acquisitions in the home country of the 
foreign director. But, they are not useful monitors over the decision-making of managers, as 
measured by earnings restatement (fraud), managers’ compensation and CEO turn-over. They 
find that the net impact of foreign directors on firm performance is negative as well; meaning 
that overall, their negative effects offset their positive contributions to the board. 
Masulis et al. (2012) separate Canadian directors in U.S. firms from other foreign 
directors and find that Canadian directors have the same attendance as U.S. directors and that the 
coefficient for the presence of Canadian directors is not significant in their regressions; meaning 
that they do not have a negative impact on the performance of firms and are not distinguishable 
from their American colleagues. This finding provides support to the argument that when foreign 
directors are from a country with similarities in terms of culture, language and economic 
development and are close geographically, then they do a better job in monitoring managers 
(Miletkov et al. 2013). However, the presence of Canadian directors in U.S. firms is not as 
prevalent as American directors in Canada. Canadian firms have more incentives to choose U.S. 
directors, due to a less developed directors’ market and also the cross-listing of firms. 
Miletkov et al. (2013) investigate foreign directors in non-U.S. firms during the period 
running from 2001-2011. Firms with foreign operations, or those that intend to expand their 
operations, tend to have more foreign directors. In addition, they find that larger firms with 
foreign operations are more likely to have foreign directors on their boards. When the directors’ 
market is not developed, then firms are more likely to hire foreign directors as well. Another 
reason for this state is to attract foreign investors. They also find that firms with foreign directors 
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have a lower performance. However, for firms with foreign sales, the negative relationship is 
lower. Yet, when foreign directors live close to a firm and are from a country with similarities 
such as culture and language, then the negative impact is mitigated. When a foreign director 
comes from a country with a more developed capital market and higher quality legal institutions, 
then the negative relationship is lower as well. 
Oxelheim et al. (2013) argue that the mixed findings regarding the impact of foreign 
directors so far can be investigated further by looking one step back; by examining how 
important the presence of foreign directors is in companies and the various reasons behind 
nominating foreign directors. Their sample covers Nordic firms during the years 2001-2008. In 
their sample, 61.55% of firms have at least one foreign director. The percentage of foreign 
directors changes from 7.8% to 13.6% in their sample period. One reason behind this increase is 
the representation of female directors, which has increased from 5% to 19% from 2001 to 2008. 
The board members come from other Nordic countries, the U.S and the U.K. They find that firms 
that are financially internationalized tend to nominate foreign directors. These firms prefer to 
nominate directors with the same nationality as the owners and also from the country in which 
the firm is cross-listed. They show that firms choose foreign directors mainly due to ‘financial 
internationalization’ other than ‘commercial internationalization’. In sum, they find that firms 
with foreign sales, foreign ownership and cross-listing tend to nominate more foreign directors. 
They find a positive relationship between performance (ROA) and foreign ownership only when 
foreign directors are sitting on the board. 
Oxelheim et al. (2013) argue that their findings may thus far reconcile the mixed 
evidence regarding foreign directors: first of all, the Masulis et al. 2012 study investigates the 
U.S. which is less internationalized than Nordic firms. Secondly, ownership is more concentrated 
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in the Nordic countries than in the U.S., and due to this ownership, agency problems are lower 
and the monitoring role of foreign directors might not be a big issue for them. In addition, they 
argue that Anglo-American board members care more about shareholder value as opposed to 
non-Anglo-American directors who might care about a wider range of stakeholders. Due to these 
differences, Anglo-American directors are associated with firm value in Nordic countries. 
Van Veen, Sahib and Anageenburg, (2014) investigate the presence of foreign directors 
in fifteen European countries during 2005-2007 and find that firms nominate foreign directors 
from countries with lower cultural, institutional and geographical distance. They also find that 
when there are more historical ties between two countries, one is more likely to nominate 
directors from there even though they are geographically far. 
In summary, based on this literature, the impact of foreign directors on firm performance 
is dependent on their prevalence and origins and also on the governance mechanisms at the firm 
and country level. Therefore, the generalization of the findings in a country to the others may not 
be appropriate. 
 
3.2.2. The Audit Committee and Financial Reporting Quality 
Previous research shows that audit committee characteristics affect the quality of 
financial reporting. Mainly, these studies investigate how audit committee characteristics 
mandated by rules and regulations, independence and expertise, affect the performance of 
directors. The independence and expertise of audit committee members are required under both 
U.S. and Canadian regulations. For firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under 
Multilateral Instrument 52-110 – Audit Committees, an audit committee must be comprised of at 
least three independent members who are financial experts or will acquire such knowledge 
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within a reasonable time period. 
Studies show that financial expertise on an audit committee translates into higher quality 
financial reporting. For instance Dhaliwal, Naiker and Navissi (2010) find that the presence of 
accounting financial experts on an audit committee is associated with higher accrual quality. 
Farber (2005) finds that firms with financial experts on their audit committee are less likely to 
commit fraud. Abernathy, Herman, Kang and Krishnan (2013) find a positive relationship 
between the presence of accounting financial experts on an audit committee and analysts’ 
earnings forecasts and how precise they are. 
As for, the independence of audit committee members and its impact on the quality of 
financial reporting, Klein (2002) finds a positive relationship between audit committee 
independence and earnings quality, as measured by abnormal accruals. She finds that a decrease 
in board or audit committee independence leads to an increase in abnormal accruals. In the same 
line, Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004) find that the occurrence of a restatement is less likely for 
firms with independent audit committee members. 
However, less has been done about the demography of audit committee members and its 
impact on their performance. For example, Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) investigate the presence 
of female directors on the audit committee of the S&P Small Cap 600 and find a negative 
relationship between the presence of female directors on the audit committee and earnings 
management, as measured by discretionary accruals. Bruynseels and Cardinaels (2014) 
document that social ties (‘friendship’) between a CEO and audit committee members is 
positively associated with earnings management and negatively associated with the likelihood of 
auditors to issue a going –concern opinion for financially distressed firms. However, when these 
ties are more formal, then there is not any negative impact on audit committee performance. 
47 
 
In this study, we investigate another dimension of audit committee demography, their 
nationality, and how having foreign directors impacts an audit committee’s performance. The 
context we choose for that investigation is Canada. 
 
3.2.3. Why Canada? 
In this study, we investigate the presence of foreign directors on the boards of Canadian 
firms and their effects on the quality of earnings. We have chosen Canada due to its unique 
characteristics. As discussed by Masulis et al. (2012) in detail, Canada has the U.S. as its 
neighbour, a country with a developed directors’ market, providing a fine pool of potential 
directors from which Canadian firms can choose. In addition, Canada and the U.S. are very 
similar in many respects such as economic development, language, culture and accounting 
practices. As large Canadian companies are cross-listed in the U.S., this may justify the need to 
have an American director on their boards. There is also no visa issue in travelling between 
Canada and the U.S. Canadian regulations regarding the independence and expertise of audit 
committee members may force Canadian firms to nominate qualified directors from outside of 
Canada, and the U.S. is probably the first option they take. Consequently, considering U.S. 
directors as other foreign directors may not be appropriate in this case, since they are close to 
Canada and share many economic and cultural values with Canadians. Thus, downsides 
components associated with foreign directors such as language distance, cultural distance, non-
familiarity with Canadian accounting standards and regulations and physical distance, might not 





3.2.4. Foreign Directors on Audit Committees  
Having a foreigner on an audit committee potentially has two effects on its oversight or 
monitoring role. On the one hand, as Oxelheim et al. (2013) argue, when directors are different 
in terms of demography, such as being a foreign director, then they may be more independent 
with respect to management’s monitoring. This effect can arise especially when foreign directors 
come from a country with high governance mechanisms such as the U.S. As a by-product, 
having a foreign director on the audit committee may lead to higher independence, and as a 
result, more effective monitoring of managers. On the other hand, although foreign directors may 
contribute to board decision-making by bringing new knowledge and diversity, they may 
diminish board performance due to differences in terms of culture, language and physical 
distance (Miletkov et al. 2013). In addition, as Masulis et al. (2012) argue, CEOs may tend to 
nominate foreign directors due to the distance involved and an expected lower level of 
monitoring over them. For that reason, the presence of foreign directors on an audit committee 
may result in a lower level of monitoring over managers. Hence, the two alternative hypotheses 
that we put forward: 
H1a: There is a positive relationship between the presence of foreign directors on an audit          
committee and earnings quality. 
H1b: There is a negative relationship between the presence of foreign directors on an    
audit committee and earnings quality. 
Due to a unique combination of foreign directors in Canada, the next question is whether 
U.S. directors differ in monitoring managers from directors from other countries. On the one 
hand, firms prefer to nominate foreign directors from countries with similarities in terms of 
culture, institutions and distance (Van Veen et al. 2013). In addition, when the differences 
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between the foreign directors’ home country and the firm location are lower in terms of distance, 
culture and language, they then do a better job in advising and monitoring managers (Miletkov et 
al. 2013). Based on this line of reasoning, U.S. directors may do a better job than other foreign 
directors, due to similarities between the two countries and proximity to Canada. 
On the other hand, even though U.S. directors have many similarities with Canadians, 
they still live far from firms’ headquarters or main operations, preventing them from gaining 
access to soft information through daily and face-to-face interaction with employees, managers 
and suppliers (Coval and Moskwitz, 1999, 2001). Moreover, based on the geography literature, 
local stakeholders do a better job in monitoring managers’ decision-making (e.g. Ayers, 
Ramalingegowd and Yeung, 2011). Therefore, even living in the U.S. may not compensate for 
lower access to soft information which is available for locals. Moreover, Beasley, Carcello, 
Hermanson and Neal (2009) provide evidence that in some firms, audit committee members are 
selected for legitimacy and to meet requirements set out in regulations other than their 
monitoring over managers. Hence, we put forward the following hypothesis, which is framed in 
null form: 
H2: There is not a significant difference between U.S directors and other foreign directors 
in Canada regarding the monitoring of the quality of financial reporting. 
 
3.3. Research Design 
3.3.1. Sample and data 
To construct the sample, we follow the same procedure as described in essay 1 (see Table 
1 panel A). In sum, the sample consists of 528 firm-year observations for the accruals quality test 
and 494 observations for earnings informativeness test.  
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Table 2 panel B shows the distribution of the sample based on industry and year. As for 
industry distribution, 23% of the firms are in the oil-and-gas industry and 24% percent of the 
firms are in the metal mining sector. Fifty-five percent of the firms are from 2010 and 45% from 
2011. 
Table 2 panel C presents the distribution of the sample based on the presence of foreign 
audit committee members in each industry. Firms in chemicals and allied product manufacturing, 
electronic and other electrical equipment manufacturing, electric gas and sanitary services and 
metal mining have the highest percentage of foreign audit committee members: 60%, 60%, 53% 
and 51% respectively. Firms in industrial and commercial machinery manufacturing with 8%, 
communications with 31% and oil and gas with 38% have the lowest foreign director 
representation on audit committees. 
Table 2 panel D presents the distribution of the sample for the presence of foreign 
independent directors: 60.8% of firms have at least one foreign director in the sample from 
which 59% of the firms nominate directors only from the U.S., 16% have board members from 
countries other than the U.S. and the rest of the 26% nominate a mix of directors from the U.S. 
and non-U.S. countries. Table 2 panel E presents the distribution of the sample for the presence 
of foreign directors on the audit committee. For 46% of the firms, there is at least one foreign 
director sitting on the audit committee from which 69% of the firms nominate directors from the 
U.S. 19% have audit committee members from countries other than the U.S. Lastly, 11% have 
members from the U.S. and other countries. Therefore, the U.S. provides most of the foreign 
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3.3.2. Measurement of Abnormal Accruals 
To measure earnings quality, we use Modified Jones Model (1995) as described in essay 
1.  
 
3.3.3. Measurement of Earnings Informativeness 
To measure earning informativeness we estimate the following model 
 
                                                          
                   
 
Return is the 12-months’ stock return of firm i in period t, starting nine months prior to 
the fiscal year-end and ends three months following the fiscal year-end. EPS is the earnings per 
share of firm i in period t divided by the stock price nine months before the fiscal year-end. We 
also control for other factors which may affect the association between the return and earnings. 
We include firm size, leverage, book to market, the factor analysis of governance variables and a 
dummy variable for loss, cross-listing and foreign transaction.    measures differential earnings 






3.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 panel B presents descriptive statistics for the presence of independent foreign 
directors on the boards of the firms. The mean percentage of foreign independent directors on the 
boards is 22%. Fifteen percent of the independent directors are from the U.S. and 6% from other 
countries. Panel B also shows that 19% of audit committee members are foreign directors: 14% 
reside in the U.S. and the remaining of 5% are from other countries. In comparison with studies 
that have been done in the U.S. and Europe, the presence of foreign directors is more prevalent in 
this sample. This may be partly attributable to different time periods and the fact that this sample 
covers more recent data. However, the proximity of the U.S. to Canada might contribute to 
having a good pool of directors to choose from for Canadian firms. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 PANEL B ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3 panel C shows the descriptive statistics for the governance variables at firm level 
for firms with and without foreign audit committee members. Firms with foreign audit 
committee members have larger boards (8.23 v-s. 7.53), a lower percentage of local institutional 
investors (2.79% v-s.5.79%), larger audit committees (3.72 v-s. 3.26), a lower number of other 
directorships (1.24 v-s. 1.42) and lastly, a higher representation of female directors (6% v-s 5%). 
Table 3 panel C also shows the descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis for sample 
firm characteristics. Firms with a presence of foreign audit committee members have higher 
absolute abnormal accruals (0.054 v-s. 0.047), are larger (2.62 v-s. 2.50), have a lower change in 
cash flow from operating activities (0.003 v-s. 0.030) and have a lower change in sales revenues 
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(0.09 v-s. 0.12). Firms located in Quebec and incorporated under Quebec law are less likely to 
nominate foreign directors (0.02 v-s. 0.08). Fifty-five percent of firms with foreign audit 
committee members have foreign operations as opposed to 45% of firms without foreign audit 
committee members. Forty-two percent of firms with foreign directors on the audit committee 
are cross-listed versus 18.6% of firms without foreign directors on the audit committee. These 
firms have a lower stock return (0.04 v-s. 0.15) and earnings per share deflated by stock price (-
0.022 v-s. 0.007). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 PANEL C ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 4 panel D shows the correlation table for governance variables and foreign 
directors’ representation on the audit committee. The percentage of foreign directors on the audit 
committee is positively correlated with board size and audit committee size, but negatively 
correlated with local institutional ownership, family ownership, CEO and board tenure. Table 4 
panel E presents the correlation for the variables that enter into the regression for accrual quality. 
Absolute abnormal accruals are positively correlated with the percentage of foreign directors on 
the audit committee (0.101, p-value <0.05), and with the percentage of U.S. directors on the 
audit committee (0.11, p-value <0.05). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 PANEL D ABOUT HERE] 





3.4.2. Multivariate Analysis – Abnormal Accruals 
In the first multivariate analysis, we regress earnings quality, as measured by abnormal 
accruals, on foreign directors’ measures and control variables. We control for the firms’ 
characteristics that are associated with earnings quality, according to prior research: firm size, 
leverage, change in revenue, reporting of a loss, change in cash flow from operating activities, 
change in net income, cross-listing, having foreign operations and ROA. We also control for 
incorporation law, since Filip, Labelle and Rousseau (2014) show that firms incorporated under 
Quebec law and located in Quebec have better earnings quality than firms incorporated under the 
Canadian Business Corporation Act (CBCA) and Provincial laws. We also control for 
governance variables at the firm level. Based on a factor analysis of governance variables, we 
use the first factor which has the most explanatory power with an eigenvalue higher than 1. 
Table 5 panel A shows the loading components of the factors loaded on the first factor. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 PANEL A ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 8 shows the results for accrual quality. Absolute abnormal accruals are positively 
associated with the percentage of foreign audit committee members (0.029, p-value <0.05). In 
the third model, when we separate U.S. directors from other foreign directors, we find that only 
the percentage of U.S. directors on the audit committee is associated with higher absolute 
abnormal accruals (0.036, p-value <0.05). The percentage of foreign directors from countries 
other than the U.S. does not have a significant effect on accrual quality. This finding provides 
support for the first hypothesis that the presence of foreign directors on the audit committee 
impairs their monitoring of managers. In addition, and contrary to previous studies, our finding 
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shows that directors from a country with many similarities, such as the U.S., do not appear to be 
successful in monitoring managers’ decision-making regarding earnings quality. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.4.3. Multivariate Analysis - Earnings Informativeness 
In next step, we calculate earnings informativeness by regressing the annual return on 
earnings per share and the foreign directors’ presence on the audit committee. Table 4 panel F 
shows the correlation table for the variables that enter into this model. The correlation between 
the annual returns and the interaction between EPS and the percentage of foreign directors on the 
audit committee and the percentage of U.S. directors on the audit committee are negative and 
significant at 1%. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 PANEL F ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 9 presents the results of the multivariate analysis of earnings informativeness. The 
percentage of foreign directors on the audit committee negatively impacts the relationship 
between returns and earnings (-2.493, p-value <0.01). When we separate the percentage of U.S 
directors from other foreign directors, then only the coefficient for U.S. directors is significant (-
2.679, p-value <0.01).  
 




Overall, multivariate results provide evidence that, in general, having foreign directors on 
the audit committee is negatively associated with earnings quality and nominating foreign 
directors from a country with many similarities does not compensate for their inability to oversee 
managers’ disclosure qualities. 
 
3.5. Robustness Analysis 
The first concern regarding the robustness of the results is endogeneity. Reverse causality 
may be an issue; in firms with lower earnings quality, firms may choose to nominate foreign 
directors to enjoy a quiet life. Alternatively, an omitted correlated variable may drive our results. 
Following Oxelheim et al. (2013), to address this concern, we add firm fixed effect to the 
regressions. Untabulated results are still significant using this model. In the accrual model, the 
dummy variable for having a foreign director on the audit committee, the percentage of foreign 
directors on the audit committee and the percentage of U.S. directors on the audit committee are 
significant at 5%, 1% and 1% respectively. In the earnings informativeness regression, the 
coefficient for the interaction between EPS and the percentage of U.S. directors on the audit 
committee remains significant at 1%. 
As another robustness check for endogeneity problem, we use two-stage Heckman 
procedure (1976). In first stage, we calculate the Inverse Mills ratio from a probit model. As 
Oxelheim et al. (2013) argue firms with financial and commercial internationalization tend to 
nominate foreign directors, therefore, we control for cross-listing and having foreign 
transactions. We also control for ownership structure by the percentage of local institutional 
ownership and percentage of institutional ownership. We also control for board size since, 
Oxelheim et al. (2013) argue that larger boards probably have a larger network and as a results 
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are more likely to find foreign directors to nominate. We also control for firm size, leverage, 
performance, change in sales and presence of female directors on the board.  
Results of the first stage in table 10 show that cross-listed firms, with institutional 
ownership and firms with foreign transactions tend to nominate foreign audit committee 
members. In additions, firms with local institutional investors are less likely to hire foreign 
directors on the audit committee. The model is significant with a likelihood ratio of 70.162 and 
Pseudo R
2
 statistic of 0.16. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In the next stage, we use the Inverse Mills ratio, calculated at first stage, to control for the 
endogeneity problem. Results of the accrual quality model in table 11 are still significant (0.018, 
p-value <0.05). Table 12 shows the results for earnings informativeness using Invers Mills ratio. 
The coefficient for the interaction between EPS and the dummy variable for the presence of 
foreign audit committee member is still negative and significant at 1%. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Another concern regarding the findings is that firms with 100% foreign audit committee 
members may drive our results. However, there are only seven observations in the sample with 
100% foreign directors on the audit committee and dropping them does not change the results. 
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An alternative explanation for this finding may be the social connections between the 
CEO and other board members and foreign directors, that may prevent them from monitoring 
managers effectively. Prior research shows that social ties mitigate directors’ independence 
(Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014). Nevertheless, it is less likely that foreign directors have more 
social ties with the CEO than non-foreign directors, those who reside closer to the firm. 
We also run a robustness check for signed accruals. The results of the second stage show 
that for positive accruals (income increasing), the coefficient for the dummy variable (presence 
of a foreign director on the audit committee) is significant (0.015, p-value <0.01), but for 
negative accruals (income decreasing), the effect of having foreign directors on the audit 
committee is not significant. We also interact the governance variable with foreign directors’ 
measures to check if strong corporate governance would prevent CEOs from intentionally 
nominating foreign directors. However, the coefficient for the interaction term is not significant. 
An alternate explanation for not finding any significant effect for non-U.S. foreign directors 
might be that they are from specific countries. Nevertheless, they are not clusters in any 
geographical area (there are 75 observations in the sample with non-U.S. foreign directors) 
 
3.6. Conclusion and Discussion 
In this study, we investigate the presence of foreign directors on the audit committee and 
its impact on their performance. The audit committee is considered the hallmark of boards in 
monitoring managers’ decisions regarding financial disclosure. Therefore, audit committee 
members seem more related to monitoring disclosure quality. In Canada, the governance system 
is considered principle-based as opposed to the U.S. which is rules-based. However, when it 
comes to the audit committee members, Canada has a rules-based approach mandating the 
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presence of independent financial experts on the audit committee. This may in turn force 
companies to go beyond Canadian borders to fulfill these requirements, considering there is not a 
developed directors’ market in Canada. Using a sample of Canadian firms for 2010-2011, we 
find a negative relationship between the percentage of foreign audit committee members and 
earnings quality. In addition, firms with U.S. members on the audit committee have a lower 
earnings quality than other firms in the sample. In sum, our results provide evidence that having 
foreign directors, even at the highest level of similarities between the two countries, may not 
contribute to their performance, at least regarding monitoring disclosure quality. 
This study contributes to three streams of research: First of all, our study is the first that 
investigate the presence of foreign directors on the audit committee and its impact on earnings 
quality. Previous research has focused on foreign directors at the board level and firm 
performance 
3
(e.g. Masulis et al. 2012). Our results provide evidence that is in line with previous 
studies that foreign directors have a negative effect on firm performance. However, our results 
are in contrast with the finding by Miletkov et al. (2013) that when foreign directors come from a 
country with many similarities then they do a better job in monitoring and advising managers. 
Secondly, our results contribute to the literature about the demography of foreign directors (e.g. 
Bruynseels and Cardinaels, 2014) by providing evidence that independent and expert audit 
committee members who reside in another country are not able to fulfill their duties regarding 
monitoring managers. Lastly, it provides insights for regulatory bodies that mandating diversity 
(both statutory and demographic) may result in firms going outside to meet these requirements, 
and this in turn may have unanticipated consequences. In addition, even an audit committee that 
meets regulatory requirements may still not be effective in monitoring managers, since other 
aspects such as demographic diversity may affect their performance. 
                                                          
3
 Masulis et al. (2012) find that firms with foreign audit committee members are more likely to restate their earnings. 
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Chapter 4: Mandatory Adoption of IFRS in Canada 
Abstract 
Previous research using an international setting provides evidence that country-and firm-level 
governance mechanisms matter for financial reporting quality. Country-and firm-level 
governance mechanisms are receiving even more attention than before, since the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). However, the findings are mixed so far. In 
this study using the unique Canadian setting in which the province of Quebec is governed by 
French civil law and the rest of Canada is governed by common law, we investigate whether the 
adoption of IFRS has different effects on Quebec firms compared with the rest of the firms in 
Canada. Using a sample of Canadian firms from 2009 to 2012, we find that first, after the 
adoption of IFRS, the absolute value of discretionary accruals has increased, but that the increase 
is mainly due to a rise in income decreasing accruals (negative accruals). Secondly, for firms 
located in Quebec (governed by French civil law), the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
has decreased, although the reduction is not significant. In addition, for Quebec firms, the 
reduction is mainly due to a decline in income decreasing accruals. Thirdly, using earnings 
informativeness as an alternate measure of earnings quality, we find that earnings 
informativeness has not changed significantly after the adoption of IFRS. However, for firms 
located in Quebec, earnings informativeness has decreased. The results hold after controlling for 
governance mechanisms at the firm level.  
The results provide slight evidence that in Quebec earnings management has decreased after the 
adoption of IFRS, although the perception of investors seems to be the opposite. Moreover, the 
results show that even in a single country setting with many similarities, the effects of IFRS 
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Previous research has documented that country specific characteristics matter for the 
quality of financial reporting. Firms in countries with high investor protection are associated with 
higher financial reporting quality (e.g. La Porta et al, 1997, 1998, Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki, 
2003). Country-level governance mechanisms are receiving even more attention than before 
since the adoption of IFRS. These studies investigate how country-level governance mechanisms 
enforce the adoption of IFRS and how they may help to ease the adoption process (e.g. Houqe, 
Zijl, Dunstan and Karim, 2012).  
In most previous studies, common law countries, by providing high investor protection, 
are associated with higher financial reporting quality than French civil law countries (e.g. 
Defond, Hung and Trezevant, 2007). However, Filip, Labelle and Rousseau (2014) find that, in 
Canada, Quebec firms incorporated based on the Quebec Corporation Act (QCA) have higher 
earnings quality than the rest of the Canadian firms. Quebec is governed by French civil law and 
the rest of Canada is governed by common law. They argue that this is due to higher legal 
liabilities for auditors and directors based on previous cases. Their study is unique since it 
doesn’t suffer from the issue in international studies in which the findings might be due to other 
country characteristics for which it is difficult to control. Nevertheless, they do not control for 
governance mechanisms at the firm level which seems to be different between Quebec and the 
rest of the firms in Canada.  
The IFRS studies that look at the effects of legal regimes on the adoption process provide 
mixed results so far. While, there is evidence that the effects of IFRS are higher in countries with 
high legal enforcement (e.g. Houqe et al, 2012, Byard, Li and Yu, 2011), there is also evidence 
that in code law countries IFRS improves the information environment (Houqe, Easton and Zijl, 
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2014, Ahmed, Chalmers and Khlif, 2013). The documented mixed results might be due to 
omitted correlated variables that are difficult to control for in international studies.  
Canada has adopted IFRS for the financial year beginning in 2011. Previous research 
investigates the adoption in an international setting. But, the Canadian setting is unique since two 
legal regimes (civil and code law) co-exist in Canada. This provides a unique setting in 
investigating how country-level governance mechanisms affect the adoption of IFRS in a single 
and clean setting.  
Based on a sample of Canadian firms from 2009-2012, we find that after the adoption of 
IFRS, the absolute value of discretionary accrual has significantly risen in Canada and this 
growth is due to an increase in income decreasing (negative) discretionary accruals. Yet, the 
effects are different in Quebec when compared with the other provinces. In Quebec, following 
the adoption of IFRS, the absolute value of discretionary accruals has decreased although the 
reduction is not significant. The decrease in absolute value of discretionary accruals in Quebec is 
due to a lessening in negative accruals. In addition, using earnings informativeness as an 
alternate measure for earnings quality, we find that there is a positive but insignificant effect on 
earnings informativeness in general. In Quebec, earnings informativeness has decreased 
significantly, even though Quebec firms have a higher earnings response coefficient than the rest 
of the firms in Canada before the adoption of IFRS. 
Our study contributes to three streams of literature. First, Filip et al (2014) find that 
Quebec firms incorporated based on Quebec Corporation Act have lower absolute value of 
discretionary accruals for the period of 1998-2008. However, our results show that before the 
adoption of IFRS (2009 and 2010) there is not a significant difference between the absolute 
value of discretionary accruals of firms in Quebec and the rest of Canada. The difference in the 
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findings might be due to not controlling for governance mechanism at firms level in Filip et al 
(2014) study, or due to the fact that we cover different periods. In the period that we cover 
Quebec has adopted a new Corporation law in 2009, which is similar to Canadian Business 
Corporation Act and this in turn may have decreased the difference in discretionary accruals 
between Quebec and the rest of the provinces. In addition, it’s possible that our small sample for 
Quebec firms may cause the model not to have enough power to capture the difference.  
Secondly, our results contribute to the IFRS literature by providing evidence that in 
general IFRS seems to decrease earnings quality in Canada. The absolute value of discretionary 
accruals has increased after the adoption of IFRS and also there is no improvement in earnings 
informativeness. In addition, the effect of IFRS is not homogenous across Canada. The effect of 
IFRS seems different on Quebec firms than the rest of the firms in Canada. The findings provide 
evidence that even in a country with many similarities the adoption of IFRS is contingent upon 
the governance mechanisms that enforce the adoption process.  
Thirdly, it also contributes to the literature that investigates country-level governance 
mechanisms and financial reporting quality. There is weak evidence that Quebec firms have 
lower earnings management than the rest of the firms in Canada after the adoption of IFRS, after 
controlling for firm-level governance mechanisms. This provides evidence in contrast to the 
previous studies that find in common law countries the adoption of IFRS is more effective. It is 
noteworthy that the perception of investors seems to be the opposite, which is reflected in lower 
earnings informativeness in Quebec firms.  
The mixed findings may also be due to the fact that 2011 and 2012 are the first years of 
the adoption in Canada and that it may take some time to see the real impact of IFRS on the 
financial reporting quality of Canadian firms. 
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4.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
4.2.1. IFRS Adoption 
More than one hundred countries around the world have adopted IFRS in past years and 
there is still an ongoing trend of adoption in other countries. On the one hand, proponents of 
IFRS argue that it will decrease managers’ opportunistic behaviour due to its having more 
requirements for disclosure compared with domestic GAAPs (Barth, Landsman and Lang, 2008, 
Ahmed et al, 2013). On the other hand, opponents believe that it will give managers more 
opportunities to manage earnings due to its being principle-based (Barth et al, 2008). 
Since the adoption of IFRS, there have been numerous studies on the effects of IFRS on 
quality of financial reporting. The research at the early stages focuses on the voluntary adoption 
of IFRS (e.g. Harris and Muller, 1999). The studies that ensue focus mainly on the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS (e.g. Byard et al., 2011). However, in using different settings, methodologies 
and measures the results are mixed so far. 
Following a review of the literature on the effects of the voluntary adoption of IFRS, 
Soderstorm and Sun (2007) argue that the mixed findings in the IFRS adoption studies might be 
a result of selection bias. The adopting firms may have different attributes that drive their 
decisions to voluntarily adopt IFRS.  
In a review paper of IFRS studies, Ahmed et al (2013) categorize them into three groups. 
First, there are studies that investigate the value relevance of financial information, secondly, we 
have research on the effects of IFRS on discretionary accruals and thirdly, there are the effects 
on analyst forecasts. The results of the three groups are mixed so far: 
On the one hand, there are studies that find that after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, 
financial reporting quality has not improved. For instance, Callao and Jarne (2010) investigate 
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the effects of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on the discretionary accruals in 11 European 
countries from 2003-2006. They find an increase in the discretionary accruals after the adoption 
of IFRS. Clarkson, Hanna, Richardson and Thompson (2011) investigate the value relevance of 
earnings in European countries and Australia and do not find a significant change in the value 
relevance of earnings. Jansson, Jonsson and Koch (2012) investigate analysts’ forecasts after the 
adoption of IFRS in five European countries. They find that except for U.K firms, in the rest of 
the countries, there is no significant improvement in analysts’ earnings forecasts.  
On the other hand, there is evidence of improvement in the quality of financial reporting 
in some studies. For example, Chen, Tang, Jiang and Lin (2010) find a decrease in the 
discretionary accruals for firms in European countries from 2000-2007, however, there is 
evidence of earnings smoothing after the adoption of IFRS. Byard et al (2011) find that analysts’ 
earnings forecasts have improved after the adoption of IFRS in European countries. In addition, 
Devalle, Onali and Magarini (2010) document improvement in the value relevance of earnings 
for firms in the U.K., Germany and France after the adoption of IFRS. 
 
4.2.2. Country-level governance Mechanism and the Quality of Financial Reporting 
Previous research documents the effects of country-level governance mechanisms in the 
financial markets and the quality of financial reporting (La Porta et al, 1997, 1998). Research in 
this area considers common law countries to have a higher financial reporting quality, due to 
higher investor protection (e.g. Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi, 2008). For example, Leuz et al 
(2003) find that earnings management as measured by the quality of accruals and loss avoidance 
is lower in countries with strong investor protection and legal regimes. Francis and Wang (2007) 
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find that in countries with high investor protection, audit quality is associated with earnings 
quality. In countries with weak investor protection, they find no association. 
Fillip et al, 2013 investigate the effects of legal regimes (common versus civil law) on the 
quality of financial reporting. Using the unique Canadian setting, they find that firms located in 
Quebec and incorporated under the Quebec Corporation Act have a higher earnings quality than 
the rest of the firms in Canada. Their results provide support for the civil code law being seen as 
more effective in decreasing earnings management. 
Since the adoption of IFRS, researchers have paid more attention to country-level 
governance mechanisms. As Soderstorm and Sun (2007) argue, changing only the accounting 
standards may not result in better financial reporting quality, since other than IFRS, factors such 
as legal regimes and incentives are contributors to a better accounting system. 
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) investigate the effects of the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
on earnings management in Australia, France and the U.K., countries that are considered as early 
adopters. They find that in France, a code law country, earnings management increases and in the 
U.K. and Australia there is no effect on earnings management, as measured by loss avoidance. 
Houqe et al (2012) using a sample of 46 countries from 1998-2007 find that in countries 
with higher investors’ protection, the mandatory adoption of IFRS leads to greater financial 
reporting quality, as measured by discretionary accruals.  
Byard et al (2011) investigate the effects of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on firms in 
the European Union. They find that analyst forecast error and dispersion decrease only for firms 
located in countries with high legal regimes and when the difference between IFRS and local 
GAAP is high. For firms located in a weak legal environment and high differences between IFRS 
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and local GAAP, companies with high firm-level motivation see a decrease in their forecast 
errors. 
In contrast, Houqe et al (2014) find that in France, Germany and Sweden, countries 
characterised by civil law and low investor protection, firms have better forecast accuracy and 
precision after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. 
Ahmed, Neel and Wang, 2012 probe into the effects of the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
on income smoothing, reporting aggressiveness and meeting or beating a target. They match 
IFRS firms from 20 countries with companies that have not adopted IFRS based on industry, 
size, book-to-market, performance and legal regimes. They find an increase in net income 
volatility after the adoption of IFRS. They also find a rise in accruals and a decrease in 
conservatism. But they do not find any evidence of earnings management through meeting or 
beating benchmarks. Their results hold for firms in countries with high legal enforcement. As 
Nelson (2003), argues due to the fact of being principle based, IFRS give managers more 
discretion over financial reporting and even strong legal enforcement may not be able to control 
that. 
Ahmed et al (2013), using meta-analysis examine the effects of IFRS on the value 
relevance of earnings, the level of discretionary accruals and analysts’ forecast error and 
precision. They find that discretionary accruals have not decreased after IFRS and the adoption 
of IFRS is not associated with accruals. Nonetheless, the value relevance of earnings has 
increased after IFRS. They also find improvement in analyst forecast accuracy after IFRS. They 
argue that previous studies that report mixed results regarding the effects of IFRS on accruals are 
due to the use of different models. They contend that their results are the same, after controlling 
for differences in legal regimes. 
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In sum, previous research provides mixed evidence on the effects of country-level 
governance mechanisms as to the effects of the adoption of IFRS. 
Besides the country-level governance mechanism, previous research underscores the 
importance of the firm level governance mechanism on the financial reporting quality. Gaio 
2010, using a sample of firms in 38 countries from 1990-2003, finds that firm-level 
characteristics also explain earnings quality, after controlling for country-level characteristics. 
Firms with more insider ownership, larger firms and firms with more investment opportunities 
are associated with higher earnings quality. Firm-level characteristics are more important in 
countries with high investor protection. They argue that through time the importance of firm-
level characteristics gains in intensity due to globalization. 
Bonetti, Parbonetti and Magnan (2013) investigate the joint effects of the country-and 
firm-level governance mechanism on the adoption of IFRS in European countries. They find that 
in countries with weak legal enforcement, firm-level governance mechanisms, board and audit 
committee characteristics, act as a substitute, and in countries with high legal enforcement firm-
level governance mechanisms play a complementary role for country-level governance 
mechanisms.  
 
4.2.3. IFRS Adoption in Canada 
There are a few studies that investigate the effects of IFRS in Canada: 
Cormier and Magnan (2013) explore the effects of IFRS on the value relevance of 
earnings in Canada. They compare the value relevance of earnings between 2009 and 2011, 
finding that after the adoption of IFRS, the value relevance of earnings has increased, but 
earnings smoothing has risen as well. 
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Liu and Sun (2014), using a sample of Canadian companies from 2009-2012, find that 
after IFRS, positive discretionary accruals have decreased. Also, small positive earnings are 
lower after the adoption of IFRS. They do not find any differences in term of earnings response 
coefficient after the adoption of IFRS. They also find that earnings are more persistent after the 
adoption of IFRS.  
 
Canada adopted the IFRS beginning in 2011. Liu and Sun (2014) claim that the effects of 
the IFRS on Canadian firms might be different for two reasons. First, most of the Canadian 
companies are concentrated in a few industries. And secondly, accounting standards in Canada 
are different from the countries that have been investigated in previous studies. Moreover, 
Cormier and Magnan (2013) maintain that since Canadian accounting standards are similar to the 
U.S. (due to the convergence policy of Canadian GAAP to U.S. GAAP), the findings in the 
Canadian setting may provide insight for U.S. regulators in their decision to adopt IFRS.  
In addition, the province of Quebec is governed by French civil law and rest of Canada is 
governed by common law. In Quebec, firms can incorporate under the Quebec Corporation Act 
(QCA) or the Canadian Business Corporation Act (CBCA). QCA is different from CBCA in 
terms of investor protection. However, in 2009 Quebec adopted a new law which provides 
similar protection to minority shareholders and is similar to CBCA. The new law became 
mandatory in February 2011. This change will help to isolate the effects of incorporation law 
from civil law in Quebec. 
Filip et al (2014) document that firms located in Quebec and incorporated based on QCA 
have a higher earnings quality than firms located in Quebec and incorporated based on CBCA 
and other provinces. This discrepancy might be the result of differences in incorporation law, 
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different legal regimes or both. If civil code is associated with higher earnings quality, then 
adoption of IFRS may result in higher earning quality in Quebec. Therefore, in this study of the 
Canadian setting we investigate two questions: 
1. Whether the adoption of the IFRS has any effects on financial reporting quality of 
Canadian firms? 
2. Whether IFRS have different effects on firms located in Quebec compared with the rest 
of the firms in Canada  
 
Hypothesis  
H1: The adoption of IFRS has no effect on the financial reporting quality in Canada 
 
H2: The effects of the adoption of IFRS are not different in Quebec firms when compared 
to the rest of the firms in Canada  
 
4.3. Research Design 
4.3.1. Sample and Data 
The sample is based on Canadian firms in Compustat for the fiscal years ending 2009 to 
2012. We start with Canadian firms in Compustat for the fiscal year 2010. Then, we eliminate 
firms from the financial industries (SIC-Code 6021-6999), incorporated outside Canada, and 
firms with headquarters outside of Canada. We also exclude firms on the Venture Toronto Stock 
Exchange, since they are small and are subject to different filing requirements. We also exclude 
investment trusts because they have different tax and dividend regulations. In addition, 506 
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observations are removed due to lack of data for financial variables in Compustat. Small firms --
with market capitalization below $10 million -- are disregarded too. Eleven firms with negative 
equity are excluded as well. Finally, 141 firms are omitted as there are fewer than six 
observations in their industries for which to calculate abnormal accruals.  
Next, we collect governance data from proxy statements. Data from annual information 
forms and proxy circulars filled by Canadian companies are from SEDAR. For missing 
information, we use “The Directory of Directors” which is a database including the personal 
information of directors in Canada. For 26 firms, the data from proxy circulars is not complete; 
therefore we eliminate them from the sample. Lastly, there are 265 firms for year-end 2010 with 
complete data. 
Afterwards, we collect the data for these firms for 2009, 2011 and 2012. We have 245 
firms for the year 2009, 237 for 2011 and 191 for 2012 with complete data, because of delisting 
and missing variables in Compustat and proxy circulars. In total, the sample consists of 938 firm-
year observations. Table 1 panel B shows the sample selection process. 
To investigate earnings informativeness, we collect stock price data from the CFMRC 
database. Yet, stock price data is missing for 174 firms. Therefore, the final sample for earnings 
informativeness consists of 764 firm-year observations. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 PANEL B ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 panel F shows the distribution of the sample based on industry and year. As for 
industry distribution, 24.2% of the firms are in the oil-and-gas industry and 23% percent of the 
firms are in the metal mining sector. Table 2 panel G presents the distribution of the sample 
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based on industry and location. A total of 14.5 % of the firms in the sample are located in 
Quebec and 85.5 % are located in rest of the provinces of Canada. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 PANEL F ABOUT HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 2 PANEL G ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.3.2. Measurement of Abnormal Accruals 
To measure the earnings quality, we follow the model used by Filip et al (2014) which is 
based on the Modified Jones Model (Jones, 1991), as presented by Dechow et al. (1995) and 
modified for performance (Kothari, Leone and Wasley, 2005)  
 
    
          
    
 
          
    
      
          
    
     
          
          
     
          
   
     
          
     
 
Where      is the firm’s total accruals in industry two-digit code, measured as change in 
non-cash current assets minus change in current liabilities adjusted for the current portion of 
long-term debt minus the depreciation and amortization expense.            is the firms’i total 
assets in year t-1 and two-digit SIC code j.        is the change in revenue from the previous 
year for firm i in two-digit SIC code j.       is the gross property, plant and equipment for firm i 
in two-digit SIC code j.      is the book value to market value of equity for firm i in two-digit 
SIC code, and       is the cash flow from the operating activity for firm i in two-digit SIC code. 
       is return on assets for firm i in two-digit SIC code. we estimate the parameters of the 






          
    
            
          
    
     
          
          
     
          
   
     
          
 
 
Where       is the change in accounts receivables from the previous year for firm i in 
two-digit SIC code j. The measure for discretionary accrual is the absolute value of the 
difference between total accruals and predicted normal accruals. we winsorize all the variables 




 percentiles to prevent the effect of outliers. 
The second measure of accruals is also similar to the model that has been used by Filip et 
al (2014) which is based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model and modified by McNichols 
(2002).  
 
    
          
        
       
          
    
     
          
   
       
          
   
      
          
   
     
          
     
 
Where      is the firm’s total accruals in industry two-digit code, measured as change in 
non-cash current assets minus change in current liabilities, adjusted for the current portion of 
long-term debt minus the depreciation and amortization expense.            is the firms’i total 
assets in year t-1 and two-digit SIC code j.        is the change in revenue from the previous 
year for firm i in two-digit SIC code j.       is the gross property, plant and equipment for firm i 
in two-digit SIC code j.       is the cash flow from the operating activity for firm i in year t. 






4.3.3. Measurement of Earnings Informativeness 
We use a market measure for earnings quality as well to ensure the results are robust vis-
à-vis an alternate measure of earnings quality. It additionally provides evidence on how market 
participants perceive the adoption of IFRS and their effects on financial reporting quality.  
 
To measure earnings informativeness we estimate the following model 
 
                                                                
                                                  
               
 
Return is the 12-months’ stock return of firm i in period t, starting nine months prior to 
the fiscal year-end and ends three months following the fiscal year-end. EPS is the earnings per 
share of firm i in period t divided by the stock price nine months before the fiscal year-end. We 
control for other factors too which may affect the association between the return and earnings. 
We include firm size, leverage, book-to-market, the factor analysis of governance variables and a 
dummy variable for loss and cross-listing in the U.S. 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 panel D presents the descriptive statistics: The mean of the absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals calculated based on the Modified Jones Model is 0.038. However, for 
Quebec firms, the mean is 0.028 and for the rest of the firms in Canada it is 0.040. Based on the 
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Dechow and Dichev model, the mean of the absolute value of the discretionary accrual is 0.043. 
Again, Quebec has a lower mean of 0.032 than the rest of Canada with a mean of 0.045. A total 
of 14.5% of the firms in the sample are located in Quebec and the rest are located in the other 
provinces of Canada. The mean of the logarithm of the assets is 2.58, but Quebec has a mean 
size of 2.54 and slightly smaller firms than the rest of the firms in Canada. In general, 27 percent 
of the firms in the sample are cross-listed in the U.S. In Quebec, this percentage is 18.4, and in 
the rest of the provinces the percentage is 28.8. The mean of the leverage is 0.37. Quebec firms 
are more leveraged than the rest of the firms in Canada (0.41 versus 0.37). The mean of the ROA 
is -0.010 which is higher for Quebec firms (-0.002 versus -0.011). Forty percent of the firms in 
the sample have reported a loss which is 33 percent for Quebec firms and 42 percent for the rest 
of Canada. The mean of change in net income scaled by total assets is 0.02 which is 0.018 for 
Quebec versus 0.022 for the rest of the firms. The mean of change in cash flow scaled by total 
assets is 0.019, 0.018 for Quebec and 0.020 for the rest of the firms. The mean of change in 
revenues is 0.053 which is almost similar between Quebec and the rest of Canada (0.052 versus 
0.054). The mean of book-to-market ratio is 0.76. Quebec firms have a mean of 0.67 versus 0.77 
for the rest of Canada. The average annual return is 0.05, which is 0.09 for Quebec and 0.04 for 
the rest of the firms. Finally, earnings per share have a mean of -0.013, however Quebec has a 
positive mean of 0.016 and the rest of Canada has a mean of -0.019. 
The descriptive statistics for the governance variables show that Board size has a mean of 
7.83. Quebec boards are larger (8.46 versus 7.73). The mean of the percentage of shares hold by 
institutional investors is 10.36. The percentage is slightly higher for Quebec firms (12.417 versus 
10.01). The mean of the percentage of shares hold by local institutional investors is 3.68 percent. 
Quebec firms have a higher percentage of 6.57 versus 3.19 for the rest of the firms. The mean of 
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the percentage of shares hold by a family member or individual is 10.6 percent. In Quebec, the 
mean is 18.8 percent versus 9 percent in the rest of Canada. The mean of the audit committee 
size is 3.49 which is almost similar between Quebec and the rest of Canada. The mean of CEO 
tenure is 8.44. Still, CEOs of Quebec firms have a longer tenure (10.71 years) than the rest of 
Canada (8.04). The average of the number of other directorships is 1.37. For Quebec firms it is 
1.08 and 1.42 for the rest. The mean of board tenure for the sample is 7.62. Board tenure for 
Quebec firms is higher than the rest of Canada (9.46 versus 7.31 years). Seventy–three percent of 
directors are independent, but in Quebec the percentage is higher (76% versus 73%). In twenty-
one percent of the firms the roles of the CEO and chairman are the same (22.8 versus 20.9). 
Eight percent of firms have dual-class shares. Nevertheless, 22.8 percent of firms in Quebec have 
dual-class shares versus six percent in the rest of Canada. On average 5% percent of directors are 
female. The average is higher in Quebec (8% versus 5% percent). Ninety-one percent of the 
firms are audited by Big 4. Finally, 60% percent of the independent directors live in the same 
province where the headquarters is located. Seventy percent of the independent directors of 
Quebec firms are local versus 58 percent of the independent directors in the rest of Canada. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 PANEL D ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 4 panel G shows the correlation table for the variable that will enter into the 
regression of the discretionary accruals. Both measures of the discretionary accruals are 
positively associated with the IFRS dummy and negatively associated with the Quebec dummy 
(QC). The factor analysis of the governance variables is negatively and significantly associated 
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with discretionary accruals. Also, size and ROA are negatively and significantly correlated with 
discretionary accruals. Finally, loss is positively correlated with discretionary accruals. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 PANEL G ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.4.2. Multivariate Analysis – Abnormal Accruals 
In the first multivariate analysis, we regress the earnings quality, as measured by the 
abnormal accruals, on the IFRS dummy and the Quebec dummy, which is a dummy variable that 
captures the difference in the legal regimes of Canada. We control for the firms’ characteristics 
that are associated with earnings quality, according to prior research: firm size, leverage, change 
in revenue, reporting of a loss, change in cash flow from operating activities, change in net 
income, cross-listing in the U.S. and ROA. We also control for the governance variables at the 
firm level. Based on a factor analysis of the governance variables, we use the first factor which 
has the most explanatory power with an eigen value higher than 1. Table 5 panel B shows the 
loading components of the factors loaded onto the first factor. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 5 PANEL B ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 13 shows the results for the accrual quality. In the first model, the absolute 
abnormal accruals calculated based on the Modified Jones Model are positively associated with 
the IFRS dummy. (0.007,  p-value <0.05). However, the effects of the IFRS on Quebec firms are 
negative and significant (-0.009, p-value <0.10). When we calculate F-test for the contrast 
between the effect of IFRS in Quebec and the rest of Canada, the F-test is not significant.  
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Houqe et al (2012) and Francis and Wang (2008) argue that using signed accruals is a 
better measure for earnings quality since the overstatement of earnings is more of a concern than 
understatement. In the next step, when we use signed accruals, for positive accruals (income 
increasing accruals) the IFRS dummy becomes insignificant and the interaction between the 
IFRS and Quebec becomes insignificant too. When we run the regression for negative 
discretionary accruals (income decreasing), then the coefficient for the IFRS dummy becomes 
positively significant (0.008, p-value < 0.10) and consequently the effects of the IFRS on Quebec 
firms become negatively significant (-0.017, p-value < -0.05). Although, the F-test for the 
contrast is not significant. Therefore, based on the Modified Jones Model, the adoption of the 
IFRS has increased the absolute value of discretionary accruals, however, this is mainly due to 
an increase in negative accruals (income decreasing). 
In the second model, we calculate the discretionary accruals based on the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model. The IFRS dummy is positively associated with the absolute value of the 
discretionary accruals (0.009, p-value <0.01). The effects of the IFRS on Quebec firms are 
negative but not significant. When we run the regression for the positive discretionary accruals, 
then the IFRS dummy is positively significant at 10 percent (0.007, p-value <0.10), but the 
effects of the IFRS on Quebec firms are negative but not significant. For the negative accruals, 
the results show that the IFRS is positively associated with income-decreasing accruals (0.010, 
p-value <0.05). Nonetheless, the effects of the IFRS on Quebec are negative which is not 
significant. When we calculate contrast test (F-test) then the difference between the effect of 
IFRS on Quebec and the rest of the firms in Canada is not significant. 
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Overall, based on the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, there is also an increase in the 
absolute value of the accruals, but this increase is mainly due to rise in the income decreasing 
accruals. The effects of the IFRS on Quebec firms are negative, but not significant. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4.4.3. Multivariate Analysis - Earnings Informativeness 
In the next step, we calculate earnings informativeness, by regressing the annual return 
on earnings per share and the IFRS and Quebec dummies. Table 4 panel H shows the correlation 
table for the variables that enter into this model. The return is positively associated with the 
interaction between the IFRS and EPS (0.14, p-value< 0.01). The return is positively correlated 
as well with the interaction between the Quebec dummy and EPS (0.13, p-value <0.01). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 PANEL H ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 14 presents the results of the multivariate analysis of the earnings informativeness.  
In model 2, we regress the return on EPS, the IFRS dummy and the interaction between 
IFRS and EPS. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive, but not significant. In model 3, 
we control for size, leverage, book-to-market, governance mechanisms at the firm level, loss and 
cross-listing in the U.S. After controlling for these variables, the coefficient for the interaction 
term becomes negative but not significant. 
In model 4, we add a dummy variable for the effects of the IFRS on the earnings 
informativeness of the Quebec firms. In general, the earnings informativeness of the Quebec 
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firms is higher (0.76, p-value < 0.01) before the adoption of IFRS, yet, after the adoption of the 
IFRS, it has decreased (-0.92, p-value <0.10). The result of the contrast test (F-test) for 
comparison between the effect of IFRS on earnings informativness of Quebec firms versus the 
rest of the firms in Canada is significant (p-value<0.084). In model 5, after controlling for the 
firm characteristics and the governance mechanisms at the firm level, the results still hold and 
also the contrast test is significant (p-value < 0.072). 
 
[INSERT TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE] 
 
On the whole, it seems that the IFRS do not have any effects on earnings 
informativeness. However, for Quebec firms, the earnings informativeness has decreased, even 
though, earnings informativeness in Quebec was higher than the rest of the firms in Canada 
before the adoption of IFRS.  
 
4.5. Conclusion and Discussion 
There is extensive research on the adoption of the IFRS. Still, the results are mixed so far. 
In this study, we scrutinize the effects of the mandatory adoption of the IFRS on Canadian firms. 
The Canadian setting is worth investigating due to the different legal regimes that coexist 
(French versus common law). 
We find that, in general, IFRS have increased the absolute value of the discretionary 
accruals, but that the increase is mainly due to a rise in income decreasing accruals. The effects 
of the IFRS in Quebec seem slightly different from the rest of Canada although it’s not 
significant. The absolute value of the discretionary accruals in Quebec has decreased and is 
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predominantly due to decrease in income decreasing accruals. As for the value relevance of 
earnings, the IFRS do not significantly affect the earnings response coefficient. Nevertheless, the 
IFRS have decreased earnings informativeness in Quebec. 
This study contributes to three lines of research. First, our findings are in contrast to the 
findings by Filip et al (2014). They find that discretionary accruals are lower for firms located in 
Quebec and incorporated based on QCA compare to the rest of Canada, however our findings 
show that before the adoption of IFRS there is not a significant difference between absolute 
value of discretionary accruals of Quebec firms and the rest of Canada. In addition, after the 
adoption of IFRS it seems that there is a widening gap between the two. Secondly, our study 
adds to the IFRS literature by providing evidence that in general, IFRS has not improved 
earnings quality in Canada, however the effect is not homogenous across the country. The 
insignificant improvement in financial reporting quality might be due to small differences 
between the Canadian GAAP and IFRS. Thirdly, our findings add to the literature of country-
level governance mechanisms and financial reporting quality by providing evidence that code 
law legal regime is associated with lower earnings management after the adoption of IFRS. 






Chapter 5: Conclusion and Discussion 
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This dissertation focuses mainly on two mechanisms that are considered a means of 
improving the quality of financial information: Governance mechanisms --at both the firm and 
country levels -- and adoption of a new set of accounting standards.  
The first essay centers it attention on the dimension of a board of directors’ diversity, 
which has received attention by regulators. However, less is known about its consequences on 
the performance of directors (e.g. Alam et al, 2012, 2014). Using the unique Canadian setting in 
which firms must disclose the residential addresses of their directors, the results provide support 
that a local board is more effective when it comes to monitoring managers’ decisions regarding 
the quality of financial reporting. Local directors are able to do their monitoring job better than 
those who live far from firms, because they have access to local information (Coval and 
Moskwitz, 1999, 2001). The results are in line with Alam et al (2014) who find that after 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the average distance between directors and firm headquarters has increased 
and this has caused directors to rely more on public information, which is shown in CEO 
compensation being more associated with stock price. They argue that this in turn has increased 
discretionary accruals. Our study establishes a direct link between the geographic diversity of 
directors and the quality of financial reporting. 
The second essay probes into a special class of directors: foreign directors. Canada has a 
rules-based approach to audit committee membership. This has resulted in having many U.S. 
directors sitting on the audit committee of Canadian firms. However, upshot of their members of 
the audit committee on improving the quality of financial reporting is not clear yet. Results of the 
second essay show that having U.S. directors on the audit committee is associated with a lower 
level of financial reporting quality. The results are interesting since American directors share 
many similarities with Canadians and are close to Canada geographically. Yet, they still 
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contribute negatively to firm performance; this might be due to the undesirable consequences of 
new regulations. Even having foreign directors from a country with many similarities will result 
in their not being good monitors of managers, if they are nominated solely to meet the 
requirements of the regulations. 
The last essay is centered on two issues: First, whether the adoption of the IFRS has any 
effects on the quality of financial reporting in Canada, and secondly the interaction between the 
adoption of new accounting standards and governance mechanisms as well at the firm and 
country levels. The results provide evidence that the adoption of IFRS has not improved the 
quality of financial reporting in Canada in general. Nonetheless, the impact of IFRS seems 
different on Quebec and non-Quebec firms. The findings add to the IFRS literature, by providing 
evidence that in a Canadian setting the IFRS have not improved the quality of financial 
reporting. Secondly, it adds to the research on legal regimes and the quality of financial 
reporting, by providing evidence that in a civil law regime, the IFRS show a slight decrease in 
earnings management. 
In general, the results of these essays supply insight to regulators regarding board 
diversity and also financial reporting standards. Forcing firms to follow a specific regime may 
have unanticipated consequences. Due to the financial scandals of the past two decades, there 
have been many regulations forced into action, such as the SOX and the equivalent corporate 
governance reforms in Canada, which are aimed at increasing the financial reporting quality and 
to protect investors’ wealth. However, the results of this dissertation provide evidence that these 
regulations may have unanticipated side effects that may impair their primary goal of the 
adoption. The results of the dissertation are in line with the work of this year’s Nobel Prize 
winner in economics on regulations; that the effects of the regulations might be different depend 
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on the context in which they are implemented. Therefore, the approach of “one size fits all” may 
not work for all firms, even in a single country setting. Our results show that even in a single 
country setting such as Canada, with many similarities and in the same capital markets, imposing 
new rules may widen the gap between the financial reporting quality of firms, depend on the 
context. 
The results of this dissertation also provide evidence that we may need to revisit our 
understanding about the finding by La Porta et al, 1997 and 1998, who document that common 
law countries are associated with higher investor protection and financial reporting quality. The 
results of the third essay provide slight support that a civil code law regime is more successful in 
mitigating earnings management.  
Finally, institutional and legitimacy theories may help to interpret the results. Firms may 
follow corporate governance best practices for the purposes of legitimacy, and this may justify 
why following corporate governance best practices may not necessarily lead to a better financial 
reporting quality.  
Using different econometric methods, we have tried to mitigate concerns about the 
endogeneity problem; however it’s not possible to completely eliminate this issue. As for the 
first essay, the case may be that firms with a better quality of financial reporting have the power 
to hire more local directors and therefore the causality might be reversed. In the second essay, it 
may be that firms that hire foreign directors on the audit committee are the ones that have a 
lower quality of financial reporting in the first place, and are looking for directors who are not 
close to the firm. As far as the last essay is concerned, it’s possible that other differences 
between Quebec and rest of Canada might drive our results and not the difference in legal 
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regimes. For example, since public firms in Quebec are smaller than the rest of the firms in 
Canada, consequently, the adoption of the IFRS might not be that complex in Quebec and, 
therefore, the IFRS have no negative effects on the discretionary accruals of Quebec firms.  
In this dissertation we concentrate mainly on mandatory disclosure, however it would be 
interesting to look at the effects of the board of directors’ geographical diversity on voluntary 
disclosure of firms. Firms that hire non-local directors may increase their voluntary disclosure to 
provide more information to non-local directors. As Armstrong et al (2010) argue, directors are 
busy people and may focus mainly on public disclosure in their decision-making. For instance, 
the impact on management earnings forecasts can be investigated.  
Regarding the adoption of the IFRS, it would be interesting to focus on their adoption by 
the oil and gas and mining industries, since Canada ‘s industries are mainly concentrated in these 
two areas; the use of accrual models may not capture the earnings quality of these firms, due to 
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Table 1: Sample Selection 
Panel A: Sample Selection for the First and Second Essays 




Canadian firms in Compustat for fiscal year 2010 1971 
Exclude:  
Headquartered outside Canada 123 
Financial Firms (Code 6021-6999) 489 
Match with 2009 data 224 
Small firms (market cap below 10 Million) 307 
Financial variables missing 257 
Firms in Venture Toronto Stock Exchange  56 
Trusts 47 
Less than 6 observations in the industry (SIC 2-digit) 141 
Firms with negative equity 11 
Incomplete data from proxy circulars 26 
2010 Sample 290 
  
Firms with available data for fiscal year 2011 238 
Final sample (for accrual quality) 528 
Missing data for stock price (34) 











Table 1 (continued) 
Panel B: Sample Selection for the Third Essay 
 
Number of Firms 
 
Canadian firms in Compustat for fiscal year 2010 1971 
Exclude:  
Headquartered outside Canada 123 
Financial Firms (Code 6021-6999) 489 
Match with 2009 data 224 
Small firms (market cap below 10 Million) 307 
Financial variables missing 282 
Firms in Venture Toronto Stock Exchange  56 
Trusts 47 
Less than 6 observations in the industry (SIC 2-digit) 141 
Firms with negative equity 11 
Incomplete data from proxy circulars 26 
2010 Sample 265 
  
Firms with available data for fiscal year 2009 245 
Firms with available data for fiscal year 2011 237 
Firms with available data for fiscal year 2012 191 
Final sample (for accrual quality) 938 
Missing data for stock price (174) 











Table 2: Distribution of the Sample  
Panel A: Distribution of the Sample for the First Essay (Industry-Location) 
 
 
Industry Province  
AB BC MB NB NS ON QC SK Total % 
Metal mining  
2 43 2 2 0 54 13 4 120 22.73 
Oil and gas  
115 3 0 0 2 8 0 0 128 24.24 
Food & Kindred Products 
Manufacturing 
0 5 0 0 2 15 4 0 26 4.92 
Chemicals & Allied Prods 
Manufacturing  
1 8 2 0 0 21 9 2 43 8.14 
Industrial & Commercial 
Machinery Manufacturing  
1 0 2 0 0 6 4 0 13 2.46 
Electronic & Other 
Electrical Equipment 
Manufacturing 




0 5 2 0 0 9 4 0 20 3.79 
Measuring & Analyzing 
Instruments Manufacturers  
1 2 2 0 0 0 8 0 13 2.46 
Communications  
2 4 2 0 2 9 10 0 29 5.49 
Electric Gas & Sanitary 
Services  
14 5 0 0 2 5 4 0 30 5.68 
Wholesale Trade - Durable 
Goods  
1 2 0 0 0 6 6 0 15 2.84 
Business Services 




144 94 12 2 8 181 80 7 528 100.00 


















Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel B: Distribution of the Sample for the Second Essay (Industry-Year) 
Industry Year  
2010 2011 Total % 
Metal mining 65 55 120 22.73% 
Oil and gas 72 56 128 24.24% 
Food & Kindred Products Manufacturing 14 12 26 4.92% 
Chemicals & Allied Products Manufacturing 23 20 43 8.14% 
Industrial & Commercial Machinery Manufacturing 7 6 13 2.46% 
Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 24 18 42 7.95% 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturers 11 9 20 3.79% 
Measuring & Analyzing Instruments Manufacturers 7 6 13 2.46% 
Communications 15 14 29 5.49% 
Electric Gas & Sanitary Services 16 14 30 5.68% 
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 8 7 15 2.84% 
Business Services 28 21 49 9.28% 
Total 290 238 528 100 
% 54.9 45.1 100  
 
Panel C: Distribution of the Sample for the Second Essay (Industry – Foreign Audit Committee 
Member) 
Industry Foreign audit committee member 
0 1 Total % 
Metal mining 59 61 120 0.51 
Oil and gas 79 49 128 0.38 
Food & Kindred Products Manufacturing 15 11 26 0.42 
Chemicals & Allied Products Manufacturing 17 26 43 0.60 
Industrial & Commercial Machinery Manufacturing 12 1 13 0.08 
Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 17 25 42 0.60 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturers 11 9 20 0.45 
Measuring & Analyzing Instruments Manufacturers 7 6 13 0.46 
Communications 20 9 29 0.31 
Electric Gas & Sanitary Services 14 16 30 0.53 
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 9 6 15 0.40 
Business Services 25 24 49 0.49 
Total 
% 
285 243 528  
53.98 46.02 100  
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Table 2 (Continued) 




# OF FIRMS WITH AT 
LEAST ONE FOREIGN 
DIRECTOR 
% OF FIRMS WITH AT 
LEAST ONE FOREIGN 
DIRECTOR 
# OF FIRMS 
WITH US 
DIRECTORS 











2010 290 174 60% 104 29 41 
2011 238 147 61.76% 84 22 41 
TOTAL 528 321 60.80% 188 51 82 
 




# OF FIRMS WITH AT 
LEAST ONE FOREIGN 
DIRECTOR 
% OF FIRMS WITH AT 
LEAST ONE FOREIGN 
DIRECTOR 
# OF FIRMS 
WITH US 
DIRECTORS 











2010 290 133 45.86% 92 27 14 
2011 238 110 46.22% 76 20 14 






Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel F: Distribution of the Sample for the Third Essay (Industry-Year)  
Industry Year 
2009 2010 2011 2012 Total % 
Metal mining 55 62 55 44 216 23.03 
Oil and gas 57 67 56 47 227 24.20 
Food & Kindred Products Manufacturing 13 13 12 8 46 4.90 
Chemicals & Allied Products Manufacturing 20 20 20 14 74 7.89 
Industrial & Commercial Machinery Manufacturing 6 7 6 4 23 2.45 
Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 21 20 18 13 72 7.68 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturers 10 10 9 9 38 4.05 
Measuring & Analyzing Instruments Manufacturers 6 6 5 4 21 2.24 
Communications 13 15 14 12 54 5.76 
Electric Gas & Sanitary Services 12 14 14 12 52 5.54 
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 7 8 7 5 27 2.88 
Business Services 25 23 21 19 88 9.38 
Total 
% 
245 265 237 191 938 100.00 
26.12 28.25 25.27 20.36 100  
 
Panel G: Distribution of the Sample for the Third Essay (Industry-Location) 
Industry Location 
Rest of Canada Quebec Total 
Metal mining 193 23 216 
Oil and gas 227 0 227 
Food & Kindred Products Manufacturing 39 7 46 
Chemicals & Allied Products Manufacturing 58 16 74 
Industrial & Commercial Machinery Manufacturing 17 6 23 
Electronic & Other Electrical Equipment Manufacturing 64 8 72 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturers 32 6 38 
Measuring & Analyzing Instruments Manufacturers 10 11 21 
Communications 34 20 54 
Electric Gas & Sanitary Services 45 7 52 
Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 17 10 27 
Business Services 66 22 88 
Total 
% 
802 136 938 





Table 3: Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the First Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
Variable (N=528) Mean Median STD Min Max AB BC MB NB NS ON QC SK 
A. Governance Variables 
Board size 7.85 7.00 2.21 4.00 18.00 7.74 7.26 8.00 8.50 9.13 7.87 8.43 9.29 
Institutional Investors 11.34 0.00 16.43 0.00 90.90 10.97 7.52 7.00 16.80 28.78 12.07 14.42 2.06 
Local Institutional Investors 4.41 0.00 12.09 0.00 90.90 3.89 0.87 2.20 0.00 5.09 5.44 7.97 0.00 
Family or Individuals 9.79 0.00 20.22 0.00 94.08 6.23 5.81 10.92 0.00 11.73 11.75 17.18 0.00 
Audit Committee Size 3.48 3.00 0.90 2.00 8.00 3.39 3.38 3.83 3.50 4.63 3.49 3.48 4.29 
CEO Tenure 8.79 7.00 7.81 1.00 57.00 7.53 8.40 5.83 11.00 12.50 8.94 10.64 14.86 
Number of other Directorships 1.34 1.14 1.08 0.00 7.42 1.58 1.57 1.02 2.21 1.56 1.19 1.02 0.84 
Board Tenure 7.56 7.00 3.97 1.00 29.83 6.60 7.07 7.25 6.46 11.06 7.58 9.33 9.71 
Independent Directors 0.74 0.75 0.13 0.29 1.00 0.74 0.74 0.69 0.88 0.78 0.72 0.76 0.78 
CEO Chairman 0.22 0.00 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.23 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.24 0.00 
Dual Class 0.08 0.00 0.28 0.00 1.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.10 0.20 0.00 
Female Director 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.50 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.24 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.14 
Audit 0.91 1.00 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.99 0.90 0.83 1.00 0.88 0.85 0.93 1.00 
GOV 0.00 -0.26 1.00 -1.48 3.59 -0.32 -0.34 -0.07 -0.33 0.90 0.12 0.63 -0.06 
B. Geography variables  
SPROV 0.65 0.67 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.52 0.32 0.12 0.40 0.62 0.76 0.51 
OTHPROV 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.14 0.47 0.65 0.44 0.13 0.14 0.31 
US 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.80 0.10 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.15 0.07 0.12 
OTHC 0.07 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.89 0.04 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.06 
SPROVI 0.61 0.61 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.71 0.47 0.32 0.00 0.30 0.60 0.73 0.38 
OTHPROVI 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.18 0.49 0.73 0.54 0.17 0.16 0.42 
FIDUS 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.23 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.17 
FIDOTHER 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.83 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.02 0.04 




Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for the First Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
 
Variable Mean Median STD Min Max AB BC MB NB NS ON QC SK N 
C. Firm Characteristics 
ACCRUAL 0.050 0.033 0.057 0.000 0.500 0.050 0.065 0.016 0.053 0.040 0.053 0.036 0.029 528 
CLUS 0.258 0.000 0.438 0.000 1.000 0.181 0.426 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.276 0.163 0.714 528 
SIZE 2.560 2.503 0.825 1.090 4.594 2.728 2.462 2.679 2.760 2.811 2.451 2.514 3.213 528 
LEV 0.376 0.354 0.203 0.029 0.926 0.393 0.342 0.366 0.294 0.491 0.355 0.422 0.415 528 
ROA -0.005 0.030 0.168 -0.749 0.351 0.000 -0.023 0.005 0.126 0.007 -0.013 0.013 0.077 528 
CNI 0.025 0.013 0.131 -0.372 0.488 0.021 0.021 -0.002 0.098 -0.028 0.031 0.030 0.015 528 
CCFO 0.017 0.017 0.131 -0.547 0.446 0.037 0.014 -0.015 0.102 -0.010 0.013 0.001 0.024 528 
CSALE 0.111 0.067 0.206 -0.422 0.918 0.137 0.092 0.022 0.537 0.031 0.113 0.101 0.044 528 
LOSS 0.379 0.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 0.479 0.426 0.333 0.000 0.250 0.343 0.288 0.000 528 
QCA_QC 0.057 0.000 0.232 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.375 0.000 528 
RETURN 0.104 0.010 0.607 -0.807 3.017 0.068 0.119 -0.106 -0.344 0.079 0.157 0.089 0.068 494 
EPS -0.006 0.031 0.159 -0.974 0.456 -0.006 -0.060 0.028 0.049 0.022 0.004 0.026 0.041 494 
 
When we drop outliers for institutional investors (11.17), local institutional investors (4.15), family or individual (8.82), CEO tenure (8.29) and board tenure 






Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel B: Foreign Independent Directors on the Board. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
Variable Mean SD Median MIN MAX 
%FID 22% 23% 20% 0% 100% 
% FIDUS 15% 19% 10% 0% 100% 
%FIDOTHER 6% 13% 0% 0% 83% 
 
Foreign Independent Directors on Audit Committee 
Variable Mean SD Median MIN MAX 
%FDAC 19% 24% 0% 0% 100% 
% FDACUS 14% 21% 0% 0% 100% 
%FDACOTHER 5% 13% 0% 0% 75% 
FIDONLY 15% 35% 0% 0 1 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for the Second Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
 
  
Firms without foreign audit 
committee member 




 N=285 N=243 





Board size 7.530 1.889 4.000 15.000 8.235 2.493 4.000 18.000 0.705 -3.610 0.000 
Institutional Investors 11.548 16.317 0.000 75.900 11.097 16.586 0.000 90.900 -0.450 0.310 0.754 
Local Institutional Investors 5.794 12.925 0.000 75.900 2.793 10.823 0.000 90.900 -3.001 2.900 0.004 
Family or Individuals 10.998 20.595 0.000 92.140 8.382 19.714 0.000 94.080 -2.616 1.480 0.139 
Audit Committee Size 3.267 0.655 2.000 7.000 3.720 1.074 2.000 8.000 0.453 -5.740 <.0001 
CEO Tenure 8.983 7.833 1.000 40.000 8.562 7.784 1.000 57.000 -0.422 0.620 0.537 
Number of other Directorships 1.420 1.178 0.000 7.420 1.246 0.935 0.000 4.330 -0.174 1.900 0.059 
Board Tenure 7.802 4.399 1.200 29.830 7.268 3.396 1.000 25.200 -0.534 1.570 0.116 
Independent Directors 0.738 0.126 0.286 1.000 0.734 0.132 0.286 1.000 -0.005 0.410 0.681 
CEO Chairman 0.207 0.406 0.000 1.000 0.230 0.422 0.000 1.000 0.023 -0.650 0.516 
Dual Class 0.088 0.283 0.000 1.000 0.078 0.269 0.000 1.000 -0.010 0.390 0.694 
Female Director 0.051 0.082 0.000 0.500 0.065 0.095 0.000 0.500 0.014 -1.800 0.072 
Audit 0.919 0.273 0.000 1.000 0.897 0.304 0.000 1.000 -0.022 0.870 0.382 
FIDONLY 0.277 0.448 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.277 10.440 <.0001 
FDACDUMMY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000     
FDAC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.405 0.179 0.167 1.000 0.405 -35.290 <.0001 





Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics for the Second Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
  
Firms without foreign audit committee member  Firms with foreign audit committee member  
DIFFRNCE 
N=285 N=243 
Variable Mean SD MIN MAX Mean SD MIN MAX DIFF T-VALUE P-VALUE 
ACCRUAL 0.047 0.053 0.000 0.344 0.054 0.062 0.000 0.500 0.006 -1.220 0.222 
SIZE 2.501 0.731 1.090 4.594 2.629 0.919 1.090 4.594 0.127 1.740 0.082 
LEV 0.376 0.183 0.044 0.926 0.377 0.225 0.029 0.926 0.001 -0.050 0.958 
CNI 0.028 0.127 -0.372 0.488 0.021 0.136 -0.372 0.488 -0.007 0.620 0.536 
CCFO 0.030 0.129 -0.547 0.446 0.003 0.132 -0.547 0.446 -0.027 2.370 0.018 
CSALE 0.129 0.213 -0.422 0.918 0.091 0.195 -0.422 0.918 -0.038 2.150 0.032 
LOSS 0.396 0.490 0.000 1.000 0.358 0.480 0.000 1.000 -0.038 0.910 0.365 
GOV 0.018 1.041 -1.476 3.560 -0.022 0.954 -1.326 3.594 -0.040 0.460 0.645 
QCA_QC 0.084 0.278 0.000 1.000 0.025 0.156 0.000 1.000 -0.060 3.090 0.002 
FT 0.453 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.556 0.498 0.000 1.000 0.103 -2.370 0.018 
ROA 0.000 0.167 -0.749 0.351 -0.011 0.169 -0.749 0.351 -0.011 0.770 0.443 
CL 0.186 0.390 0.000 1.000 0.424 0.495 0.000 1.000 0.238 -6.060 <.0001 
RETURN 0.156 0.656 -0.807 3.017 0.040 0.537 -0.807 3.017 -0.116 2.160 0.031 








Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics for the Third Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
 
Variable Mean Median SD Q1 Q3 QC REST 
            n=136 n=802 
Board size 7.839 7.000 2.248 6.000 9.000 8.463 7.733 
Institutional Investors 10.364 0.000 15.303 0.000 14.930 12.417 10.016 
Local Institutional Investors 3.686 0.000 10.277 0.000 0.000 6.575 3.196 
Family or Individuals 0.106 0.000 0.213 0.000 0.128 0.188 0.092 
Audit Committee Size 3.493 3.000 0.887 3.000 4.000 3.478 3.495 
CEO Tenure 8.444 6.000 7.445 3.000 11.000 10.781 8.048 
Number of other Directorships 1.372 1.140 1.086 0.660 1.710 1.088 1.421 
Board Tenure 7.624 7.045 3.979 4.800 9.660 9.462 7.312 
Independent Directors 0.739 0.750 0.127 0.667 0.857 0.760 0.735 
CEO Chairman 0.212 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.000 0.228 0.209 
Dual Class 0.086 0.000 0.281 0.000 0.000 0.228 0.062 
Female Director 0.057 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.125 0.089 0.052 
Audit 0.915 1.000 0.279 1.000 1.000 0.926 0.913 








Table 3 (Continued) 
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics for the Third Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
 
Variable Mean Median SD Q1 Q3 QC REST 
            n=136 n=802 
ABSACCMJ 0.038 0.025 0.043 0.009 0.053 0.028 0.040 
ABSACCRDD 0.043 0.029 0.045 0.013 0.059 0.032 0.045 
IFRS 0.385 0.000 0.487 0.000 1.000 0.397 0.383 
QC 0.145 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 
SIZE 2.582 2.526 0.836 1.940 3.162 2.547 2.587 
CLUS 0.273 0.000 0.446 0.000 1.000 0.184 0.288 
LEV 0.377 0.356 0.202 0.213 0.515 0.417 0.370 
ROA -0.010 0.024 0.165 -0.061 0.072 -0.002 -0.011 
LOSS 0.409 0.000 0.492 0.000 1.000 0.331 0.423 
CNI 0.022 0.006 0.159 -0.043 0.062 0.018 0.022 
CCFO 0.019 0.012 0.141 -0.030 0.059 0.018 0.020 
CSALE 0.053 0.028 0.219 -0.034 0.130 0.052 0.054 
BM 0.761 0.608 0.595 0.387 0.975 0.677 0.776 
RETURN 0.051 0.045 0.403 -0.248 0.325 0.096 0.042 







Table 4: Correlation Tables  
Panel A: Correlation Table for Governance and Geography Variables: Pearson (Upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlations. (All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
 



























SPROV 1 0.926*** 0.808*** -0.189*** 0.025 0.117*** 0.147*** -0.178*** 0.073* -0.023 0.108** 0.023 -0.011 0.067 -0.114*** 0.048 
SPROVI 0.933*** 1 0.875*** -0.178*** 0.02 0.116*** 0.146*** -0.178*** 0.011 -0.061 0.063 0.012 -0.052 0.046 -0.142*** 0.032 
ACSPROV 0.805*** 0.863*** 1 -0.156*** 0.014 0.115*** 0.118*** -0.19*** 0.014 -0.036 0.038 -0.001 -0.04 0.015 -0.136*** 0.024 
BOARD SIZE -0.19*** -0.172*** -0.139*** 1 0.059 0.088** -0.033 0.523*** -0.066 0.108** 0.143*** 0.223*** -0.223*** 0.259*** 0.335*** 0.095** 
Institutional Investors 0.044 0.031 0.039 0.049 1 0.704*** -0.2*** -0.023 -0.014 -0.035 0.002 0.104** -0.078* 0.048 -0.056 -0.015 
Local Institutional 
Investors 
0.169*** 0.165*** 0.173*** 0.065 0.563*** 1 -0.107** -0.006 -0.051 -0.074* -0.026 0.041 -0.081* 0.093** -0.003 0.039 
Family or Individual 0.168*** 0.167*** 0.162*** -0.166*** -0.177*** -0.052 1 -0.002 0.305*** -0.203*** 0.351*** -0.133*** 0.212*** 0.383*** 0.043 -0.029 
Audit Committee Size -0.162*** -0.166*** -0.187*** 0.494*** -0.032 -0.039 -0.03 1 0.067 0.034 0.096** 0.354*** -0.054 0.168*** 0.289*** 0.072* 
CEO Tenure 0.043 -0.003 0.01 -0.055 -0.019 -0.069 0.291*** 0.079* 1 -0.106** 0.587*** -0.063 0.277*** 0.097** 0.104** -0.079* 
Number of other 
Directorship 
-0.044 -0.066 -0.049 0.223*** 0.013 -0.102** -0.246*** 0.105** -0.1** 1 -0.074* 0.065 -0.158*** -0.083* -0.034 0.072* 
Board Tenure 0.08* 0.045 0.014 0.156*** -0.034 -0.043 0.281*** 0.183*** 0.567*** -0.044 1 -0.109** 0.101** 0.24*** 0.182*** -0.026 
Independent Directors -0.024 -0.032 -0.044 0.261*** 0.144*** 0.048 -0.167*** 0.359*** -0.018 0.188*** -0.015 1 -0.155*** 0.029 0.139*** 0.145*** 
CEO Chairman -0.016 -0.049 -0.041 -0.225*** -0.07 -0.079* 0.227*** -0.031 0.281*** -0.178*** 0.086** -0.165*** 1 0.007 -0.068 -0.089** 
Dual Class 0.062 0.04 0.019 0.195*** -0.062 0.038 0.213*** 0.193*** 0.139*** -0.079* 0.265*** 0.033 0.007 1 0.195*** 0.048 
Female Director -0.111** -0.132*** -0.131*** 0.368*** -0.06 0 0.007 0.279*** 0.112** 0.057 0.234*** 0.201*** -0.07 0.206*** 1 0.081* 
Audit 0.062 0.043 0.028 0.109** 0.045 0.051 -0.057 0.051 -0.037 0.119*** -0.028 0.128*** -0.089** 0.048 0.096** 1 
 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 




Table 4 (Continued)  
Panel B: Correlation Table-Regression for Accrual Quality – First Essay: Pearson (Upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) correlations. 
(All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
 
VARIABLE ACCRUAL SPROV SPROVI ACSPROV GOV LEV SIZE CCFO CSALE CNI LOSS ROA CLUS QCA_QC 
ACCRUAL 1 -0.084* -0.107** -0.07 -0.185*** -0.086** -0.216*** 0.037 0.052 -0.067 0.197*** -0.262*** 0.005 -0.066 
SPROV -0.083* 1 0.926*** 0.808*** 0.1** -0.012 -0.097** -0.028 0.053 -0.041 -0.062 0.081* -0.227*** 0.113*** 
SPROVI -0.109** 0.933*** 1 0.875*** 0.077* 0.001 -0.098** 0.028 0.121*** -0.004 -0.061 0.07 -0.205*** 0.094** 
ACSPROV -0.079* 0.805*** 0.863*** 1 0.052 0.009 -0.108** 0.033 0.128*** -0.009 -0.033 0.022 -0.164*** 0.116*** 
GOV -0.199*** 0.04 0.036 0.022 1 0.204*** 0.01 -0.094** -0.071 -0.031 -0.245*** 0.129*** -0.114*** 0.152*** 
LEV -0.137*** 0.022 0.017 0.02 0.223*** 1 0.268*** -0.015 0.056 -0.034 -0.038 -0.025 0.025 -0.017 
SIZE -0.166*** -0.094** -0.096** -0.099** -0.024 0.284*** 1 0.039 0.004 -0.043 -0.387*** 0.397*** 0.318*** -0.042 
CCFO 0.101** 0.019 0.06 0.07 -0.172*** -0.081* 0.02 1 0.373 *** 0.411*** -0.106** 0.246*** -0.015 0.01 
CSALE 0.076* 0.078* 0.128*** 0.128*** -0.082* 0.043 0.045 0.425*** 1 0.31*** -0.162*** 0.263*** -0.06 -0.023 
CNI -0.028 -0.015 0.018 0.015 -0.045 -0.074* -0.024 0.376*** 0.37*** 1 -0.261*** 0.431*** -0.008 0.07 
LOSS 0.158*** -0.047 -0.058 -0.033 -0.234*** -0.064 -0.381*** -0.083* -0.185*** -0.308*** 1 -0.7*** -0.085* -0.057 
ROA -0.087** 0.084* 0.092** 0.065 0.168*** -0.046 0.353*** 0.182*** 0.338*** 0.457*** -0.84*** 1 0.039 0.04 
CLUS 0.029 -0.247*** -0.226*** -0.178*** -0.128*** 0.022 0.279*** -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.085* 0.063 1 -0.014 
QCA_QC -0.063 0.119*** 0.1** 0.121*** 0.16*** -0.011 -0.036 -0.022 -0.0001 0.07 -0.057 0.069 -0.014 1 
 
 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 






Table 4 (Continued)  
Panel C: Correlation Table- Regression for Earnings Informativeness – First Essay: Pearson (Upper diagonal) and Spearman (lower diagonal) 
correlations 
 
VARIABLE RETURN EPS SPROV SPROVI ACSPROV EPS*SPROV EPS*SPROVI EPS*ACSPROV SIZE LEV BM GOV LOSS 
RETURN 1 0.142*** 0.056 0.074 0.077* 0.151*** 0.177*** 0.167*** -0.053 -0.01 -0.245*** 0.024 -0.098** 
EPS 0.277*** 1 0.115** 0.114** 0.07 -0.24*** -0.126*** 0.03 0.31*** -0.058 -0.101** 0.216*** -0.619*** 
SPROV 0.066 0.112** 1 0.929*** 0.806*** -0.063 -0.047 -0.005 -0.111** 0.031 0.092** 0.092** -0.062 
SPROVI 0.073 0.137*** 0.937*** 1 0.871*** -0.04 -0.02 0.028 -0.114** 0.048 0.089** 0.079* -0.07 
ACSPROV 0.081* 0.099** 0.804*** 0.861*** 1 -0.004 0.029 0.017 -0.124*** 0.052 0.052 0.048 -0.035 
EPS*SPROV 0.112** 0.099** 0.202*** 0.192*** 0.203*** 1 0.929*** 0.704*** -0.172*** 0.095** -0.077* 0 0.064 
EPS*SPROVI 0.088** 0.079* 0.18*** 0.196*** 0.217*** 0.909*** 1 0.76*** -0.178*** 0.077* -0.054 0.019 0.042 
EPS*ACSPROV 0.084* 0.161*** 0.193*** 0.218*** 0.256*** 0.757*** 0.824*** 1 -0.111** 0.022 0.027 0.012 -0.021 
SIZE 0.064 0.345*** -0.109** -0.115** -0.117*** -0.137*** -0.153*** -0.094** 1 0.289*** -0.039 0.017 -0.379*** 
LEV 0.067 0.098** 0.06 0.062 0.059 0.034 0.048 -0.021 0.304*** 1 -0.095** 0.218*** -0.047 
BM -0.271*** -0.009 0.121*** 0.132*** 0.082* -0.063 -0.027 0.023 0.018 -0.056 1 0.051 0.109** 
GOV 0.05 0.263*** 0.029 0.037 0.014 0.087* 0.106** 0.08* -0.02 0.229*** -0.002 1 -0.235*** 
LOSS -0.166*** -0.824*** -0.045 -0.063 -0.031 -0.041 -0.008 -0.081* -0.369*** -0.079* 0.054 -0.226*** 1 
 
Due to high multicollinearity  (VIF>20) all variables that need an interaction term in the model have been centered. EPS, SPROV, SPROVI, ACSPROV are 
centered. 
 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 




Table 4 (Continued)  
Panel D: Correlation Table (Pearson)-Governance Variables and Foreign Directors on the Audit Committee-Second Essay. (All 












































Accrual 1 -0.027 
-
0.259*** 










Return  1 0.142*** -0.034 -0.095** -0.087* -0.071 -0.045 -0.03 -0.029 0.025 0.022 0.005 0.078* -0.032 0.008 -0.028 -0.013 0.029 -0.009 0.083* 





-0.036 0.18*** -0.04 -0.029 0.183*** 0.154*** 
0.168**
* 
0.03 0.255*** 0.038 -0.006 0.076* 0.067 0.115** 






0.099** 0.097** -0.101** -0.021 0.015 0.031 0.021 0.153*** -0.003 -0.03 0.006 -0.034 
FDACDUMM
Y 
    1 0.857*** 0.723*** 0.412*** 
0.159**
* 
-0.014 -0.124*** -0.065 0.251*** -0.027 -0.081* -0.067 -0.018 0.028 -0.017 0.079* -0.038 
FDAC      1 0.845*** 0.476*** 0.075* -0.021 -0.125*** -0.081* 0.124*** -0.073* -0.068 
-
0.116*** 
-0.071 0.054 -0.067 0.001 -0.018 
FDACUS       1 -0.068 0.053 0.008 -0.067 -0.024 0.111** -0.046 -0.091** -0.053 0.007 0.026 -0.027 0.018 -0.006 
FDACOTHER        1 0.053 -0.053 -0.124*** -0.111** 0.05 -0.06 0.024 
-
0.129*** 
-0.145*** 0.058 -0.082* -0.027 -0.023 
Board size         1 0.059 0.088** -0.033 0.523*** -0.066 0.108** 0.143*** 0.223*** 
-
0.223*** 
0.259*** 0.335*** 0.095** 
Institutional 
Investors 




          1 -0.107** -0.006 -0.051 -0.074* -0.026 0.041 -0.081* 0.093** -0.003 0.039 
Family 
or Individuals 
           1 -0.002 
0.305**
* 




            1 0.067 0.034 0.096** 0.354*** -0.054 0.168*** 0.289*** 0.072* 
CEO 
Tenure 




              1 -0.074* 0.065 
-
0.158*** 
-0.083* -0.034 0.072* 
Board 
Tenure 
               1 -0.109** 0.101** 0.24*** 0.182*** -0.026 
Independent 
Directors 
                1 
-
0.155*** 
0.029 0.139*** 0.145*** 
CEO 
Chairman 
                 1 0.007 -0.068 -0.089** 
Dual 
Class 
                  1 0.195*** 0.048 
Female 
Director 
                   1 0.081* 
Audit                     1 




Table 4 (Continued) 
 Panel E: Correlation Table (Pearson) –Regression of Accrual Quality- Second Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
VARIABLE ACCRUAL FIDONLY FDACDUMMY FDAC FDACUS FDACOTHER SIZE LEV CCFO CSALE CNI GOV LOSS CL FT ROA QCA_QC YEAR 
DUMMY 
ACCRUAL 1 0.059 0.054 0.101** 0.11** 0.008 -0.216*** -0.086** 0.037 0.052 -0.067 -0.185*** 0.197*** 0.005 -0.141*** -0.262*** -0.066 -0.045 
FIDONLY  1 -0.387*** -0.332*** -0.28*** -0.159*** 0.052 -0.024 0.036 0.01 0.039 -0.034 0.023 0.101** 0.048 -0.04 0.195*** 0.015 
FDACDUMMY   1 0.857*** 0.723*** 0.412*** 0.077* 0.002 -0.103** -0.093** -0.027 -0.02 -0.04 0.26*** 0.103** -0.033 -0.128*** 0.004 
FDAC    1 0.845*** 0.476*** 0.007 -0.025 -0.074* -0.074* 0.006 -0.075* 0.028 0.26*** 0.022 -0.061 -0.131*** -0.008 
FDACUS     1 -0.068 -0.037 -0.01 -0.096** -0.098** -0.036 -0.018 0.043 0.191*** -0.002 -0.088** -0.091** -0.011 
FDACOTHER      1 0.074* -0.03 0.019 0.022 0.07 -0.111** -0.018 0.172*** 0.045 0.031 -0.093** 0.003 
SIZE       1 0.268*** 0.039 0.004 -0.043 0.01 -0.387*** 0.321*** 0.31*** 0.397*** -0.042 0.068 
LEV        1 -0.015 0.056 -0.034 0.204*** -0.038 -0.02 0.257*** -0.025 -0.017 0.02 
CCFO         1 0.373*** 0.411*** -0.094** -0.106** -0.02 0.035 0.246*** 0.01 0.045 
CSALE          1 0.31*** -0.071 -0.162*** -0.054 0.13*** 0.263*** -0.023 -0.008 
CNI           1 -0.031 -0.261*** -0.003 0.041 0.431*** 0.07 -0.053 
GOV            1 -0.245*** -0.144*** 0.094** 0.129*** 0.152*** 0.034 
LOSS             1 -0.061 -0.226*** -0.7*** -0.057 -0.064 
CL              1 0.017 0.018 -0.033 0.097** 
FT               1 0.166*** -0.033 0.114*** 
ROA                1 0.04 0.051 
QCA_QC                 1 0.008 
YEARDUMMY                  1 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 





Table 4 (Continued)   
Panel F: Correlation Table (Pearson): Regression for Earnings Informativeness-Second Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 
1) 










SIZE LEV BM GOV LOSS CL FT 
RETURN 1 0.142*** -0.095** -0.087* -0.071 -0.045 -0.034 -0.008 -0.121*** -0.119*** -0.002 0.038 -0.053 -0.01 -0.245*** 0.024 -0.098** -0.068 -0.039 
EPS  1 -0.09** -0.128*** -0.123*** -0.036 -0.04 0.786*** 0.312*** 0.324*** -0.033 0.356*** 0.31*** -0.058 -0.101** 0.216*** -0.619*** -0.017 0.194*** 
FDACDUMMY   1 0.862*** 0.725*** 0.412*** -0.385*** -0.063 -0.056 -0.053 -0.006 0.037 0.09** -0.013 -0.073 -0.017 -0.036 0.262*** 0.121*** 
FDAC    1 0.84*** 0.481*** -0.332*** -0.119*** -0.165*** -0.167*** 0.008 0.032 0.021 -0.041 -0.074* -0.07 0.043 0.263*** 0.034 
FDACUS     1 -0.072 -0.279*** -0.12*** -0.192*** -0.229*** 0.089** 0.027 -0.018 -0.008 -0.045 -0.009 0.06 0.201*** 0.008 
FDACOTHER      1 -0.159*** -0.025 0.006 0.064 -0.129*** 0.015 0.067 -0.062 -0.063 -0.115** -0.017 0.157*** 0.049 
FIDONLY       1 0.024 0.067 0.054 0.029 -0.096** 0.041 -0.014 -0.083* -0.033 0.033 0.109** 0.033 
EPS* 
FDACDUMMY 
       1 0.692*** 0.627*** 0.129*** -0.002 0.245*** -0.105** -0.11** 0.14*** -0.384*** 0.035 0.155*** 
EPS* 
FDAC 
        1 0.901*** 0.198*** -0.22*** 0.114** -0.133*** -0.003 0.025 -0.056 0.047 0.063 
EPS* 
FDACUS 
         1 -0.247*** -0.162*** 0.11** -0.062 -0.014 0.053 -0.067 0.029 0.077* 
EPS* 
FDACOTHER 
          1 -0.127*** 0.007 -0.158*** 0.024 -0.065 0.026 0.041 -0.033 
EPS* 
FIDONLY 
           1 0.195*** -0.022 0.015 0.037 -0.288*** 0.002 0.046 
SIZE             1 0.289*** -0.039 0.017 -0.379*** 0.305*** 0.322*** 
LEV              1 -0.095** 0.218*** -0.047 -0.029 0.261*** 
BM               1 0.051 0.109** -0.16*** 0.038 
GOV                1 -0.235*** -0.145*** 0.111** 
LOSS                 1 -0.051 -0.252*** 
CL                  1 -0.001 
FT                   1 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 




Table 4 (Continued) 
Panel G: Correlation Table (Pearson): Regression for Accrual Quality- Third Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
  ABSACCMJ ABSACCRDD IFRS QC IFRSQC GOV SIZE LEV ROA LOSS CNI CCFO CSALE BM CLUS 
ABSACCMJ 
1.000 0.630*** 0.052 -0.101*** -0.066** -0.144*** -0.181*** 0.021 -0.129*** 0.134*** 0.028 0.047 0.049 -0.069** 0.017 
ABSACCRDD 
 1.000 0.072** -0.100*** -0.058* -0.155*** -0.178*** -0.003 -0.117*** 0.121*** 0.022 -0.025 0.017 -0.039 0.023 
IFRS 
  1.000 0.010 0.312*** 0.014 0.088*** 0.016 0.105*** -0.119*** -0.068** 0.016 0.109*** 0.131*** -0.042 
QC 
   1.000 0.600*** 0.223*** -0.017 0.081** 0.021 -0.066** -0.010 -0.005 -0.003 -0.058* -0.082** 
IFRSQC     1.000 0.154*** 0.008 0.100*** 0.027 -0.048 -0.028 -0.006 0.013 -0.016 -0.018 
GOV      1.000 0.360*** 0.297*** 0.173*** -0.311*** -0.049 -0.058* -0.065** -0.056* 0.148*** 
SIZE       1.000 0.280*** 0.387*** -0.371*** -0.094*** -0.035 -0.031 -0.020 0.334*** 
LEV        1.000 -0.009 -0.061* -0.004 0.035 0.050 -0.110*** 0.040 
ROA         1.000 -0.694*** 0.315*** 0.229*** 0.225*** -0.034 0.036 
LOSS          1.000 -0.199*** -0.118*** -0.190*** 0.129*** -0.082** 
CNI           1.000 0.504*** 0.245*** -0.082** 0.004 
CCFO            1.000 0.431*** -0.096*** 0.001 
CSALE             1.000 -0.202*** -0.060* 
BM              1.000 -0.146*** 
CLUS               1.000 
 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 






Table 4 (Continued) 
Panel H: Correlation Table (Pearson): Regression for Earnings Informativeness- Third Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 
1) 
  RETURN EPS IFRS QC EPSIFRS IFRSQC EPSQC EPSQCIFRS SIZE LEV BM GOV LOSS CLUS 
RETURN 1 0.199*** -0.357*** 0.049 0.149*** -0.093*** 0.131*** 0.028 0.067* 0.067* -0.268*** 0.113*** -0.144*** -0.027 
EPS  1.000 0.076** 0.076** 0.624*** 0.038 0.324*** 0.198*** 0.286*** -0.029 -0.263*** 0.240*** -0.643*** 0.040 
IFRS   1.000 -0.017 0.006 0.303*** -0.016 0.025 0.071* -0.016 0.175*** -0.032 -0.099*** -0.077** 
QC    1.000 0.017 0.617*** 0.112*** 0.051 -0.018 0.081** -0.055 0.226*** -0.059 -0.092** 
EPSIFRS     1.000 0.026 0.193*** 0.315*** 0.133*** 0.022 -0.226*** 0.152*** -0.406*** 0.016 
IFRSQC      1.000 0.041 0.082** -0.005 0.102*** -0.017 0.151*** -0.031 -0.029 
EPSQC       1.000 0.613*** 0.147*** 0.049 0.007 0.134*** -0.283*** 0.023 
EPSQCIFRS        1.000 0.089** 0.039 -0.021 0.086** -0.164*** 0.020 
SIZE         1.000 0.333*** -0.068* 0.388*** -0.370*** 0.321*** 
LEV          1.000 -0.123*** 0.335*** -0.064* 0.046 
BM           1.000 -0.119*** 0.182*** -0.177*** 
GOV            1.000 -0.303*** 0.145*** 
LOSS             1.000 -0.050 
CLUS              1.000 
 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 
* Significant at 0.10 
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Table 5: Factor Analysis 
Panel A: Factor Analysis for the First and Second Essays. (All variables are defined in Appendix 
1) 
 






Female Director 0.17 
Dual Class 0.61 
CEO Chairman 0.27 
Independent Directors -0.15 
Board Tenure 0.65 
Number of Other Directorships -0.32 
CEO Tenure 0.58 
Audit Committee Size 0.15 
Family or Individuals 0.72 
Local Institutional Investors 0.17 
Institutional Investors 0.16 
Board Size 0.17 
Audit -0.04 











Table 5 (Continued) 
Panel B: Factor Analysis for the Third Essay. (All variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
 
Eigenvalue: 2.343                                 % of variance:17%                              % Cumulative:17% 
 
 Component 
Board Size 0.22 
Institutional Investors -0.09 
Local Institutional Investors -0.06 
Family or Individuals 0.24 
Audit Committee Size 0.21 
CEO Tenure 0.21 
Number of Other Directorships -0.05 
Board Tenure 0.27 
Independent Directors 0.03 
CEO Chairman 0.048 
Dual Class 0.25 
















Dependent variable: discretionary accruals: Modified Jones 
























































































INDUSTRY DUMMIES    
YEAR DUMMY    
N 528 528 528 
ADJ. R2 0.142 0.148 0.144 
 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 





Table 7: Multivariate Analysis - Earnings Informativeness- First Essay. (All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1) 
 
Dependent variable: Return- heteroscedasticity- consistent standard errors 
Independent 
variables 






























SPROV  0.107 
(0.96) 
  0.104 
(1) 
  
SPROVI   0.122 
(1.23) 
  0.14 
(1.54) 
 
ACSPROV    0.12 
(1.41) 
  0.126* 
(1.73) 
EPS*SPROV  2.68** 
(2.4) 
  1.994* 
(1.77) 
  
EPS*SPROVI   2.84*** 
(2.6) 
  2.24** 
(2.11) 
 
EPS*ACSPROV    2.05*** 
(2.99) 





































       
YEAR DUMMY        
N 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 
ADJ R2 0.018 0.053 0.056 0.045 0.271 0.277 0.271 
 
 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 
* Significant at 0.10 
1. Adding interaction terms between EPS and firm characteristics will result in high multicollinearity. 
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Table 8: Multivariate Analysis-Accrual Quality- Second Essay. (All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1) 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: discretionary accruals: Modified Jones 

















































































































INDUSTRY DUMMIES    
N 528 528 528 
ADJ. R2 0.148 0.150 0.151 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 
* Significant at 0.10 
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Table 9: Multivariate Analysis - Earnings Informativeness- Second Essay. (All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1) 
Dependent variable: Return – Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
 
Independent variables 































FDACDUMMY  -0.11* 
(-1.88) 
  -0.139** 
(-2.33) 
  
FDAC   -0.287** 
(-2.32) 
  -0.340*** 
(-2.78) 
 
FDACUS    -0.323** 
(-2.41) 
  -0.367*** 
(-2.74) 
FDACOTHER    -0.208 
(-0.95) 
  -0.282 
(-1.54) 












EPS* FDACDUMMY  -1.99*** 
(-2.97) 
  -1.685*** 
(-2.7) 
  
EPS* FDAC   -2.94*** 
(-4.35) 
  -2.493*** 
(-3.76) 
 
EPS* FDACUS    -3.11*** 
(-4.41) 
  -2.679*** 
(-4.02) 
EPS* FDACOTHER    -1.738 
(-1.11) 
  -0.758 
(-0.48) 




























































INDUSTRY DUMMIES        
N 494 494 494 494 494 494 494 




Table 9 (Continued) 




*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 
* Significant at 0.10 
Due to high multicollinearity (VIF>20) all variables that need an interaction term in the model have been centered. 
EPS, FDACDUMMY, FDAC, FIDONLY AND FDACOTHER are centered. 
All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. 
















Table 10: Robustness Analysis-First stage Analysis - Second Essay. (All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1) 
First-stage analysis - Probit model for the presence of foreign directors on the audit committee 
Independent variable 
Dependent Variable: FDACDUMMY 
Coefficient                            Chi-square 
Intercept -1.7008 4.3349** 
ROA -0.3426 0.2775 
SIZE -0.2612 2.1077 
CSALE -0.8905 3.092* 
CL 1.2324 28.6648*** 
FT            0.6044 8.3633*** 
LEV          -0.309 0.3275 
Institutional Investors 2.5228 8.919*** 





Board size 0.815 2.9083* 
Female Director 1.4679 1.4548 
YEAR DUMMY -0.2045 1.1377 

















*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 
* Significant at 0.1 
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Table 11: Robustness Analysis. Second-Stage Analysis-Accrual quality - Second Essay. (All variables 
are defined in Appendix 1) 
Independent variable 
Dependent variable: discretionary accruals: Modified Jones 

















































INDUSTRY DUMMIES included 
N 528 




*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 




Table 12: Robustness Analysis. Second –Stage Analysis- Earnings informativeness - Second Essay. (All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1) 
 
Independent variables 
Dependent variable: earnings informativeness– 









EPS* FDACDUMMY -1.663*** 
(-2.68) 
















Inverse Mills Ratio 0.215* 
(1.92) 
YEAR DUMMY -0.510*** 
(-11.47) 
INDUSTRY DUMMIES INCLUDED 
N 494 
ADJ R2 0.29 
F-VALUE 14.61 
PROBF <0.0001 
*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 
* Significant at 0.1 
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Table 13: Multivariate Analysis-Accrual Quality- Third Essay. (All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1) 
 
Dependent variable: discretionary 
accruals: Modified Jones Model – 
Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
Dependent variable: discretionary accruals: DD 
































































































































































































Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 938 475 463 938 497 441 
















*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 
* Significant at 0.10 
126 
 
Table 14: Multivariate Analysis- Earnings Informativeness- Third Essay. (All variables are 
defined in Appendix 1) 
Dependent variable: Return – Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors 
 
Independent variables 













































































INDUSTRY DUMMIES   included  included 
N 764 764 764 764 764 
ADJ R2 0.038 0.176 0.206 0.178 0.210 
F-test EPSQCIFRS=EPSRESTIFRS 
 




*** Significant at 0.01 
** Significant at 0.05 
* Significant at 0.10
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Appendix 1: Variables Definition and Data Sources 
Variables  Definition Data Source 
GOV 
First factor calculated based on principal factor analysis of the governance 
variables at firm level 
 
Board size Number of directors on the board   Proxy Circular 
Institutional Investors Percentage of shares held by institutional investors Proxy Circular 
Local Institutional Investors 
Percentage of shares held by institutional investors located in the same city where 
the headquarters are located 
Proxy Circular 
Family or Individuals Percentage of shares held by a family member or individual Proxy Circular 
Audit Committee Size Number of directors on the audit committee Proxy Circular 
CEO Tenure Number of years CEO has been in this position Proxy Circular 
Number of other Directorship 
Average number of other directorships held by directors in other public 
companies 
Proxy Circular 
Board Tenure Average number of years that directors have been sitting on the board Proxy Circular 
Independent Directors Number of independent directors divided by board size  Proxy Circular 
CEO Chairman 
Dummy variable equals to 1 when CEO is also chairman of the board and 0 
otherwise 
Proxy Circular 
Dual Class Dummy variable equals to 1 when a firm has dual class shares and 0 otherwise Proxy Circular 
Female Director Number of female directors on the board divided by board size Proxy Circular 
Audit Dummy variable equals to 1 when a firm is audited by the BIG4 and 0 otherwise Compustat 
     
Geography Variables    
SPROV 
Number of directors who live inside the province where the headquarters is 
located divided by board size 
Proxy Circular 
OTHPROV 
Number of directors who live in a province other than where the headquarters are 
located divided by board size 
Proxy Circular 




Appendix 1 (Continued) 
OTHC 
Number of directors who live in a country other than Canada and the U.S. divided 
by board size 
Proxy Circular 
SPROVI 
Number of independent directors who live inside the province where the 
headquarters are located divided by number of independent directors 
Proxy Circular 
OTHPROVI 
Number of independent directors who live in a province other than where the 
headquarters are located divided by number of independent directors 
Proxy Circular 
FIDUS 




Number of independent directors who live in a country other than Canada and the 
U.S. divided by number of independent directors 
Proxy Circular 
ACSPROV 
Number of audit committee members who live in the same province where the 
headquarters are located divided by audit committee size 
Proxy Circular 
FDACDUMMY 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if there is at least one foreign directors on the audit 
committee and 0 otherwise 
Proxy Circular 
FDAC Percentage of audit committee members who reside outside Canada Proxy Circular 
FDACUS Percentage of audit committee members who live in the U.S. Proxy Circular 
FDACOTHER 




Number of directors who live in a country other than Canada divided by number 
of independent directors 
Proxy Circular 
FIDONLY 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if a foreign director is sitting on the board and not on 
the audit committee and 0 other wise 
Proxy Circular 
Firm Characteristics    
ACCRUALMJ 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated based on Modified Jones 
Model and balance sheet method 
Compustat 
ACCRUALDD 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated based on Dechow and Dichev 
and balance sheet method 
Compustat 
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Appendix 1 (Continued) 
ACCRUAL 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated based on Modified Jones 
model based on cash flow statement  
Compustat 
CLUS 




SIZE Logarithm of total assets  Compustat 
CFO Cash flow from operating activities scaled by lagged total assets Compustat 
LEV Total liabilities divided by total shareholders' equity Compustat 
ROA Net income divided by total assets Compustat 
LOSS Dummy variable equals to 1 when net income is negative and 0 otherwise Compustat 
CNI Change in net income scaled by lagged total assets Compustat 
CCFO Change in cash flow scaled by lagged total assets Compustat 
CSALE Change in sales revenue scaled by lagged total assets Compustat 
QCA_QC 
Dummy variable equals to 1 when a firm is located in Quebec and is incorporated 
under Quebec incorporation law and 0 otherwise 
Annual 
Information Form 
BM Book value to market value of common equity Compustat 
FT 
Dummy variable equals to 1 when a firm has non- zero currency transaction 
adjustment in Compustat, 0 otherwise 
Compustat 




Stock return for 12 months (from nine months before and three months after the 
fiscal year end calculated as (pit -p it-1+D) /p it-1 
CFMRC 
EPS 
Earnings per share before extraordinary items of firm i for year t divided by stock 
price nine months before the fiscal year 
Compustat 
IFRS Dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm has adopted IFRS and 0 otherwise Compustat 
QC Dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is located in Quebec and 0 otherwise Compustat 
YEAR DUMMY Year dummies Compustat 
INDUSTRY DUMMY A dummy variable equals to 1 if a firm is SIC code 10 or 13, and 0 otherwise Compustat 
 
